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DUE PROCESS IN INVOLUNTARY CIVIL
COMMITMENT AND INCOMPETENCY
ADJUDICATION PROCEEDINGS:

WHERE DOES COLORADO STAND?
CARL

E. JOHNSON*t

"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encoachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."
-

Brandeis'
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INTRODUCTION

N the past several years legal periodicals and publications
throughout the nation have begun to devote a substantial
amount of attention to the legal, moral, and medical problems
involved in depriving a person of his freedom for the purpose
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of providing him with care and treatment in a mental hospital
or an institution.' The purpose of this article shall be to present
an overview of the problems and concerns which have emerged
from this growing body of literature, and to describe and evaluate the Colorado law regarding involuntary civil commitment
and its daily administration.
2

See, e.g., I. BELKNAP, HUMAN PROBLEMS OF A STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL (1956);
A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (2nd ed. 1949); E. GOFFMAN,
ASYLUMS (1961); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (Lindeman & McIntyre
eds. 1961); W. OVERHOLZER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW (1953); R. ROcK,
HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1968); T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND
PSYCHIATRY (1963); V. TARsiS, WARD 7 (1965); D. Brofman, Colorado Case Law

on the Mentally Ill, (unpublished paper written in the early 1960's) ; Birnbaum, The
Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Chayet, Law and the Mentally 111, 18
HARV. L. S. BULL. 10 (1967); Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TExAS L. REv. 424 (1966); Curran, Hospitalization of
the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REV. 279 (1953); Dix, Hospitalizationof the Mentally ll
in Wisconsin: A Need for Re-examination, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1967); Kaplan,
Civil Commitment 'As you Like It, 49 B.U.L. REV. 14 (1969) ; Kittrie, Compulsory
Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Process," 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 28
(1960); Kittrie, Justice for the Mentally Ill, 41 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y. 46 (1957);
Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REV.
383 (1962) ; Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incompetency: A Sceptical Inquiry into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 564 (1963) ; Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the
Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968); Meyer &
Rheingold, Mental Capacity and Incompetency: A Psycho-Legal Problem, 118 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 827 (1962); Robson, Commitment and Release of the Mentally Ill
Under Criminal Law, 11 CRIM. L.Q. 186 (1969) ; Ross, Commitment of the Mentally II: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV. 945 (1959); Slovenko,
The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty and the Law, 13 U. KAN. L. REV. 59 (1964); Swartz,
Compulsory Legal Measures and the Concept of Mental Illness, 19 S.C.L. REV. 372
9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 399
(1967); Szasz, Civil Liberties and the Mentally I11,
(1960); Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill, 50 MICH. L. REV. 837 (1952);
Zenoff, Civil Incompetency in the District of Columbia, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
243 (1963) ; Comment, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill: Due Process and Equal
Protection, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 187 (1969) ; Note, District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1062 (1965) ; Note, The New
York Mental Health Information Service: A New Approach to Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 67 COLUM. L REV. 672 (1967) ; Comment, Hospitalization of the
Mentally Disabled in Pennsylvania: The Mental Health - Mental Retardation Act of
1966, 71 DICK. L. REV. 300 (1967); Comment, Compulsory Commitment: The
Rights of the Incarcerated Mentally Ill, 1969 DUKE L.J. 677; Comment, Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Ill in Pennsylvania, 5 DUQUESNE UNrV. L. REV. 487
(1967) ; Note, Comments on a Draft Act for the Hospitalization of the Mentally III,
19 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 512 (1951); Note, Adjudication of Insanity-Commitment Proceedings Without Prior Notice and Hearing is not a Denial of Due Process
Since Subsequent Statutory Hearing is Available, 57 HARV. L. REV. 847 (1962);
Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in the District of Columbia, 13 How.
L.J. 303 (1967) ; Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally IIIin Nebraska. 48
NEB. L. REV. 255 (1968); Comment, The New Mental Health Codes; Safeguards
in Compulsory Commitment and Release, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 977 (1967); Comment, Analysis of Admission and Release Procedures at the Yankton State Hospital, 14 S.D.L. REV. 266 (1969) ; Note, Constitutionality of Nonjudicial Confinement, 3 STAN. L. REV. 109 (1950); Note, The Need for Reform in the California
Civil Commitment Procedure, 19 STAN. L. REV. 992 (1967); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 822 (1967); Note, Due Process for
All - ConstitutionalStandards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U.
CHI. L. REv. 633 (1966); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 107 U. PA.
L. REV. 668 (1959) ; Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134
(1967) ; Note, Equal Protection of the Laws- State Cannot Deprive an Individual
of Jury Review of Civil Commitment Decision or Judicial Determination of Dangerous Propensities Solely on the Ground That he is Presently Serving Penal Sentence,
12 VILL. L. REV. 178 (1966); Note, Analysis Legal and Medical Considerationsin
the Commitment of the Mentally II, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 (1947).
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The exploration of Colorado law and practice will consist of two parts: (1) An analysis of the statutes and cases
most relevant to considerations of due process in involuntary
commitment proceedings integrated with empirical observations and comparisons of the administration of the law in
Denver, Arapahoe, and Jefferson counties; and (2) Evaluations, criticisms, and recommendations based on the analysis
and observation.
I. THE OVERVIEW
Today problems of mental health have become among the
most serious facing the nation, and the legal process has become intimately involved with these problems. One-half of all
hospital patients in the United States today are mental patients.
The majority of these have been placed in institutions by the
operation of some compulsory legal process based on the state's
police power and on the doctrine of parens patriae.3 Yet, in
no other area of the law are the standards of due process so
nebulously defined.4 For instance, the most commonly required
elements of due process (in some states, the only ones) are
notice and hearing.' However, even the exact meaning of these
minimum requirements varies considerably. In some states
service of notice on a relative of the subject is sufficient
notice.' Under some statutes the attendance of the subject is
not required at the hearing.7 Some states, using a "confiscation of property" rationale, require no hearing before commitment,8 and a habeas corpus proceeding may be the only
means of challenging confinement.
One reason for the lack of uniformity in procedural standards governing the commitment process is that most procedural rights a commitment subject enjoys are not considered
to be constitutional rights but merely the results of the state's
beneficence expressed in the statutes. 9 The courts which have
3

Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 668 (1959).

4 See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW

table
VIII-C at 239-45 (F. Lindman & D. McIntyre, Jr. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION].In a more recent study sponsored by the American Bar
Foundation, the author compares commitment practices in California, Delaware, Missouri, and Pennsylvania. See R. ROCK, HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL
(1968).
5
Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Comment, The New Mental Health Code: Safeguards in Compulsory Commitment

and Release, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 977, 979 (1967).
9 See Prochuska v. Brinegar, 251 Iowa 834, 102 N.W.2d 870 (1960); State ex rel.
Hussman v. Hursh, 253 Minn. 578, 92 N.W.2d 673 (1958); Ex parte Higgins v.
Hoctor, 332 Mo. 1022, 62 S.W. 2d 410 (1933).
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reached this conclusion have relied on the "privilege" or "benefit" doctrine. Since the state, by providing treatment for an
individual, is really according him a benefit, rather than taking away a right, the due process standards, which are applicable in areas where the state may deprive a citizen of some
right, are lowered.1 °
Although some lower federal courts have held that the
subject of a civil commitment proceeding must be provided
the assistance of counsel as a matter of constitutional right,1"
the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on this question." Recently the Court sidestepped the issue of the nature
of due process in civil commitment proceedings by relying on
equal protection grounds to overrule a New York statute which
prescribed a different civil commitment procedure for prisoners
whose sentences were soon to expire from that applied to other
persons." The Court avoided any discussion of the question
of a commitment process subject's right to counsel as a matter
of procedural due process to which counsel for the petitioner
had devoted ten pages of his brief. 4
The existence of grave procedural problems is evident
from even a cursory survey of the relevant secondary literature.
In Chicago a Polish immigrant discovered a sum of money
missing from her apartment. Since the building janitor was
the only person other than her husband who had a key to the
apartment, she suspected him of taking the money and confronted him with an accusation of theft. The janitor telephoned
the police and, upon their arrival, stated that the woman and
her husband were insane. The police took the couple in handcuffs to the Cook County Mental Health Clinic. A "hearing"
was held. The immigrants had but a rudimentary knowledge
of English and were not provided with counsel. They were
pronounced mentally ill and committed to the Chicago State
Hospital. Bewildered, frightened, and confused by his sudden
inexplicable imprisonment, the husband, who had spent time
10 Note, Due Process for All - Constitutional Standards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 633, 636-37 '(1967) (hereinafter cited as Due
Process for All].
11 Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) ; cf. Dooling v. Overholser, 243
F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
12 In 1940, the Supreme Court dismissed as premature due process objections to the
discretionary procedural provisions of a Minnesota commitment statute which provided inter alia that the subject may be represented by counsel and that if the subject
were found indigent, the court "may appoint counsel to represent him," since the
law had yet to be applied to the petitioner. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate
Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 (1970).

13Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
14 12 VILL. L. REv. 178, 182 (1966).
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in a concentration camp during World War II, hanged himself during the sixth week of his confinement.' 5
Although wantonly extreme injustices such as this one
and authenticated cases of "railroading"' 6 may be comparatively rare, the relevant literature reveals a universal laxity in
establishing and maintaining adequate procedural safeguards
in the area of mental incompetency adjudication and involuntary commitment.
Even in the majority of adjudication and involuntary commitment cases, where presumably gross miscarriages of justice
do not occur, hundreds of thousands of individuals are yearly
subjected to a process which, at worst, is conducted with scant
regard for whatever legal requirements exist, and, at best,
constitutes, in its sloppy and perfunctory administration, a
serious affront to the dignity of those unfortunate persons
subjected to it.
In preparing his paper on the role of lawyers in the adjudication and commitment process, 7 Fred Cohen spent one
afternoon observing a typical Texas commitment hearing where,
under the provisions of the applicable statute, forty individuals
were committed for an indefinite period of time. The hearings
were held before a judge in a large room at the Austin State
Hospital. One local attorney had been appointed as guardian
ad litem to represent all of the individuals whose fates were
to be determined that afternoon. Two staff doctors at the state
hospital were sworn as witnesses as the hearing began. The
judge then called the name of the first subject. He did not
appear. The clerk of the court asked for his height, weight,
hair, and eye color. One of the doctors supplied this information. Referring to a file in front of him, the judge again gave
the name of the subject and recited the dates of the medical
examinations. He then asked the doctors: "Is it your opinion
that Mr. X is a mentally ill person and needs medical care and
treatment in a mental hospital for his own welfare and protection or the protection of others, and is mentally incompetent?"
Most of the other cases were disposed of in a similar
fashion as a parade of staff doctors filed in to perfunctorily
answer the same statutorily prescribed question. The attorney
remained mute and his principal activity appeared to consist
of a close scrutiny of each file to insure that notice require15 Kutner,

The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REV.
383, 383-84 (1962).
18 See Annot., 145 A.L.R. 711 (1943).
17 Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
44
TEXAS L. REv. 424 (1966).
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ments had been observed. He also signed a jury trial waiver
form for each subject.18
Only two of the 40 subjects appeared in person at the
hearing. One of these was a woman who had written the guardian ad litem to protest her mental competency, but he had
made no attempt to contact her before the hearing. He did
proceed to briefly cross-examine the testifying doctors by asking them how long they had been practicing and if they were
absolutely sure of their diagnosis. The testimony of one physician revealed that he was substituting for a doctor who had
actually examined the woman and that his only direct contact
with her consisted of a short conversation before the hearing.
The other physician who testified stated that the woman was
making progress and a furlough was imminent. The attorney
spoke with the patient about the prospect of a furlough and
she agreed that everything would be all right if she would be
home in 3 or 4 weeks. She then left the room. At the end of
an hour and a half the hearings were over. All 40 individuals
had been found mentally incompetent and committed. For his
services the guardian ad litem was paid ten dollars per case.1"
A similar procedure appears to be the general rule throughout the country. In San Francisco the required examination of
a subject for commitment by two doctors generally consists of
nothing more than a short conversation between the individual
and the doctors.2 0 Court reviews of medical commission decisions rarely exceed five minutes.2 ' Although public defenders
are provided for subjects desiring court reviews, they generally
become involved in a case only a half hour before a hearing and
22
rarely speak or take any other active role in the proceeding.
The general sloppiness of adjudication and commitment
procedure is particularly reprehensible in view of the fact that
serious consequences can result from the decisions made during
the process. In addition to a deprivation of liberty, a subject
of a commitment proceeding frequently suffers an automatic
loss of a great many personal and civil rights. These generally
include the right to vote,28 to hold office, 24 to contract, 25 to
181d, at 428-30.
19Id.
20 Note,

The Need for Reform in the California Civil Commitment Procedure, 19

STAN.

L. REV. 992, 995-96'(1967).
21 Id. at 996.
22

1d. at 997. See also Comment, Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Ill in
Pennsylvania, 5 DUQUESNE L. REv. 487 (1967).
2 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 4, table IX-D at 291-96.
24 Id.
2 Id. table IX-A at 275-79.
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make a will,26 to drive an automobile,27 to serve on a jury,
and to engage in certain occupations.2 9 In most cases he will
also be subject to subtle forms of economic and social discrimination when he seeks employment, attempts to establish credit,
or to join an exclusive club.
A major objection to present commitment procedures goes
to the heart of the "benefit" theory long used by courts to avoid
inquiry into the operation of the procedures. 30 A great many
individuals committed never receive any benefit in terms of
treatment or therapy, but instead are subjected to an extended
(perhaps even lifelong) period of custodial confinement dif31
fering little from prison incarceration.
Once committed, an individual in many states becomes,
for all practical purposes, bereft of legal remedies to challenge
the conditions of his confinement or to seek release. As in the
case of internal prison practices, the courts have traditionally
applied a "hands off" doctrine when the internal practices of
mental hospitals have been challenged. 2
In seeking release a patient may face virtually insurmounttable obstacles. The state bears the burden of proof in the
original commitment proceeding and this burden is usually
measured by the familiar civil "preponderance of the evidence"
standard. 3 However, in seeking release, the burden may fall
totally on the patient to establish by satisfaction of the same,
or an even higher, evidentiary standard that he is "sane" or
"mentally competent." To do this, he must overcome several
formidable hurdles. First of all, he may experience great difficulty in communicating with the outside world. This may be
true even though a statute gives mental patients the right to
freely communicate with people outside the institution including attorneys, judges, physicians, and friends. Since most patients are generally not in a position to enforce these rights,
many institutions severely limit the opportunities of their patients to speak with persons outside and extensively censor the
26 Id. table IX-B at 282-84.

27Id. table IX-D at 291-96.
28
Id.
29 Id. table IX-C at 285-90.
30 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
31 Due Process for All, supra note 10, at 639. See also Note, The Nascent Right to
Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967).
32 Due Process for All, supra note 10, at 639. See also Haynes v. Harris, 344 F.2d 463,
465 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Sutton v. Settle, 302 F.2d 286, 288 (8th Cir. 1962).
33 Due Process for All, supra note 10, at 654.
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patients' letters.34 Even if the patient is successful in reaching
the appropriate judicial authority to arrange a release hearing,
the cards are stacked against him. Many attorneys refuse or
hesitate to represent mental patients seeking release, even in
the uncommon situation where the patient can afford such
assistance. 5
Should the patient succeed in obtaining adequate representation, he still faces the problem of marshalling evidence
beneficial to his case. The state automatically has at its disposal a plethora of evidence to support its objection to release,
principally in the form of voluminous psychiatric reports and,
of course, the readily available testimony of staff psychiatrists,
psychologists, and social workers. Courts generally rely on expert testimony in cases of this kind. Unless the patient is extraordinarily wealthy, an extremely rare situation in involuntary commitment cases, he will not be able to obtain independent
experts to support his contention that he is ready for release
or to be adjudicated as "restored to reason.' 36
There are a great many factors which have led to the
present loose procedural practices in civil commitment and
incompetency proceedings, and which continue to militate
against any effective reform in the area.
A formidable difficulty is that of solving the major policy
question: What kind of person should be deprived of his liberty and, perhaps, of many of his personal and civil rights by
operation of a mental health law? Opinions on this question
vary widely among psychiatrists, psychologists, lawyers, legislators, and others involved with the process. Some maintain
that a person should be involuntarily committed only when
it is clear that he constitutes a clear danger to others.3 7 However, many state statutes take the other extreme and grant the
power to order confinement and treatment whenever such a
course of action would "help the individual" or be in "his
best interest."13 8 The statutory provisions defining the types
of individuals who may be committed take positions at every
point on this spectrum, but the majority are vaguely worded,
neither precisely defining the type of illness nor the type of
341d. at 655. See also AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 4, at 142-45. The
authors present, in tabular fashion, various state statutes regarding correspondence
and visitation. Id. table V-A at 158-60.
35 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 4, at 129.
36 Due process for All, supra note 10, at 655.
3

7 T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 233-34 (1963).

38

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,

ch. 91

supra note 4, table 11-B at

, § 1-8 (Smith-Hurd 1966).

49-51.

See

ILL. ANN. STAT.
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behavior which could subject an individual to confinement
under the law. 9
Purposely or coincidentally this statutory vagueness has
contributed to use of these statutes as a catch-all to handle a
wide variety of social problems. These statutes are frequently
used to provide a means of caring for elderly persons without
families or whose families are unable to care for them. Further,
in many states, including Colorado, an order of adjudication
is generally the only practical way to set up a conservatorship
or guardianship for an aged individual who is no longer able
to adequately manage his property.40 Individuals with alcohol
problems, drug addicts, and even epileptics are frequently institutionalized under this procedure. 4 ' Persons who somehow
don't quite "fit in" are apt to become involved in the process.
The statute of one state even specifies potential nonconformity
to the established laws, ordinances, conventions, and morals
as one basis for commitment,4 2 and, in the actual practice of
all states, a person who has become a problem for his family
or a pest to his neighbors stands a chance of becoming the
subject of a commitment proceeding. Up until a few years ago
the commitment procedure was frequently used in some Colorado counties to place rebellious teenagers who had become
management problems for their parents in the state hospital
43
at Pueblo.
In addition to offering vague definitions of the types of
individuals who can be subject to commitment and/or adjudication, the statutes, whose provisions again differ widely from
state to state, are often ambiguous or even silent on such basic
procedural matters as: (1) notice, 4 4 (2) attendance of the
subject, 45 (3) procedure for the conduct of the hearing, 40 and
(4) place of hearing. 47 Even in those states where the right
to counsel is unequivocally recognized, the statutes generally
do not delineate specifically the duties and responsibilities of
counsel.4 8
39

4, at 17-18.
d. table II-A at 44-48. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-1(b) (1963).
41 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 4, table II-A at 44-48.
42
MAss. ANN.LAWS ch. 123 § 1 (1957).

40

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note

43This information was conveyed to the author by an official of the Jefferson County
District Court clerk's office.
4AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 4, table II-D at 63-64.
45
Id. table II-E at 65.
4Id. table I-C at 56-59.

47 Id.
4 Cohen, supra note 17, at 441.
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The formulation of comprehensive, clearly articulated
statutes embodying essential procedural safeguards would not
by itself solve the problems in this area. In those states which
have enacted model acts, whose provisions on their face seem
fully adequate to protect the rights of those subject to their
operation, the law is often ignored or diluted by those persons
charged with their administration, partly because of a lack of
the financial and human resources necessary to achieve full
compliance and, in many cases, partly because the professionals
closely involved with the commitment and adjudication process
disagree with the legal requirements and purposely deviate
from them. Thus, a statute may provide for a "full and fair
hearing," but in practice a hearing will consist of cursory examination rarely exceeding ten minutes duration, frequently
at a time when the subject is under sedation. The law may
provide that a subject shall be informed of his statutory right
49
to counsel, but in practice this may not be done.
A serious policy conflict over what constitutes proper procedure for civil commitment and incompetence adjudication
has also slowed the pace of procedural reform. This conflict
involves a division between what can be characterized as a
"therapeutic" approach versus a strict "safeguard of rights"
viewpoint. The most outspoken proponent of this latter position is Dr. Thomas Szsaz. Taking a highly skeptical view,
shared by some of his colleagues,5 of the ability of psychiatry
to properly deal with the issues presented in commitment and
adjudication proceedings, he maintains that because of the
serious consequences which can result from an adjudication
or commitment hearing, the subject of such a proceeding should
enjoy virtually all of the formal procedural safeguards, including right to counsel and jury trial, which a suspect in a criminal
case is guaranteed."
Advocates of the "therapeutic" viewpoint insist that procedural requirements should never be rigid and should, in every
case, be subordinated to a consideration of what would be most
conducive to the treatment of the commitment subject. This
would necessarily be a determination only the treating doctor
could make. Thus, under this view, if the doctor felt that compelling the subject's attendance at the commitment or adjudi49

Kutner, supra note 15, at 385.
50 Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incompetency: A Skeptical inquiry into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14
SYRAcusE L. REV. 564 (1963).

51T. SzAsz, supra note 37, at 69 § 244.
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cation hearing or even notifying him of such a hearing would
be harmful to him, then these normal procedural requisites
52
should not be required.
Although most lawyers and doctors involved with these
problems would probably favor some intermediate approach,
such a solution has not yet been reached and probably will not
be realized until the legal profession, as a whole, becomes
seriously concerned and involved with the process. Luis Kutner
suggests one possible compromise solution. He maintains that
jury trials should not be part of the commitment and adjudication process, both because they place the subject under great
stress and are thus not therapeutically helpful, and because a
jury does not possess the competence to deal with the complex
issues involved in such proceedings. For therapeutic reasons
all similarities between a commitment or adjudication proceeding and a criminal trial should be eliminated in order to avoid
compounding the feelings of persecution a subject may already
have developed. Kutner recommends an informal, basically
non-adversarial hearing at which the subject is represented by
counsel and during which all of the participants are actively
seeking to arrive at the best possible solution for the subject's
problems. The hearing should be conducted before an impartial
medical panel and the subject should have the opportunity to
be examined by an independent expert whose testimony would
always be seriously considered. He also insists that the attendance of the subject, uncontrolled by sedation, as well as adequate notice of the hearing to the subject and his counsel, are
minimum, indispensable due process requirements.5"
The general failure of lawyers to contribute meaningfully
to the commitment process has also stymied reform in this
area. There are several reasons why attorneys have not played
a stronger, more influential role in the process. First of all, the
whole format and atmosphere of the commitment proceeding is
strange to them. Most states define the commitment process
as a totally unique type of proceeding. It is considered to be
neither a criminal nor civil action. 4 Thus, unless the attorney
finds an opportunity to use the jury trial provision of a commitment law (a rare occurrence), his experience in the adver52 Perhaps the most articulate spokesman for this point of view is Dr. Winfred Over-

53
5

holser, who believes the problems raised by such people as Szasz and Kutner have
been grossly exaggerated. See OVERHOLSER, TIE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 73-100
(1953). See also Note, Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerationsin Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 (1947).
Kutner, supra note 15, at 392-99.

4 See note 114 infra.
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sarial process which characterizes most of our legal system will
be of little aid to him in determining how to play his role in
the commitment process.5 5 As previously mentioned, statutes
rarely define the role of counsel in any detail, and the cases
have not filled this void. " ' Furthermore, the attorney in a
commitment or adjudication proceeding does not have tradition
to rely on as does, for example, the criminal lawyer. There is
no specific Canons of Ethics provision to which to refer for
guidance, and the organized bar has done little to define a
role for counsel in mental health situations. Finally, most law
schools do not provide any professional training to equip the
attorney for his role in the process. 57 As a result, the attorney
in a commitment or adjudication case often lacks a clear idea
of the identity of his client, the loyalty owed his client, the
goals desired by and desirable for his client, and what consti58
tutes success in the area.
Equally important as a factor limiting the effectiveness
of counsel in the commitment process is the low rate of compensation paid for their services. Most commitment subjects
who are represented have court-appointed counsel who receive
a set fee of between ten and twenty-five dollars per case. Although this rate of compensation may seem adequate, or even
exorbitant, for the job attorneys are presently performing in
the process, it obviously does not constitute a sufficient incentive for an attorney to invest the time necessary for a thorough
preparation of each case.
A serious lack of financial and human resources obviously
pervades the whole mental health field. The adjudication and
commitment processes suffer substantially from this deficiency.
In fact, many of the defects noted so far, such as the predominance of perfunctory hearings and examinations, the ineffectiveness of counsel, and the general inability of a commitment
subject to receive the benefit of an independent expert's services and testimony, can be traced to the failure of legislatures
to allocate a sufficient amount of money to insure a fair and
humane commitment process.
II. COLORADo LAW AND PRACTICE

This section consists of a description and analysis of the
Colorado statutes and cases dealing with the compulsory hosCohen, supra note 17, at 446.
Id. at 424.
57 Id. at 441.
58 Id. at 447.
5

56
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pitalization and commitment of the mentally ill, integrated
with a series of empirical observations of the actual everyday
administration of these laws in the Denver metropolitan area.
The purpose of this undertaking was threefold: (1) to attempt
a comparison between the formal law- as set forth in the
statutes and court opinions - and the law as it is administered
in day-to-day practice; (2) to attempt to gain an insight into
and evaluate the standards of "due process" inherent in the
practices under the present formal law with a view to suggesting changes and improvements in the present commitment and
adjudication procedures; and (3) to attempt to provide the
practicing attorney with a basic rudimentary description of the
present commitment and adjudication procedures in Colorado
and their administration.
Although the empirical portions of this paper are based
upon relatively few random observations of a continually ongoing process gathered over a comparatively short period of
time (February, March, and April, 1969), I have been assured
by those involved with the process for several years that the
events I have witnessed are typical of what has happened and
continues to happen every day in the administration of Colorado's present commitment laws.59
A. The Compulsory Hospitalization, Commitment, and
Adjudication Procedures
There are basically four ways in which an individual may
be confined under the mental health statutes: (1) by voluntarily entering any hospital, "° (2) pursuant to the emergency
procedure, 1 (3) pursuant to the short term involuntarly hospitalization procedure, 2 and (4) pursuant to the indefinite
term involuntary commitment procedure."
59 My observations focused on aspects of the involuntary commitment and hospitaliza-

tion process in Denver, Arapahoe and Jefferson counties. In each of the counties, I
received the willing cooperation of the judges, the court clerks, and their staffs. They
assisted in arranging to view court files, interviews of petitioners seeking to have
someone hospitalized or adjudicated, medical commission hearings, and court reviews
of hospitalization orders. In addition they provided insights into the process which
could never have been obtained from observation alone. At no time was it felt that
anyone was attempting to conceal anything or to misrepresent in any way the true
operation of the process. Thus, any criticisms, express or implied, of the current
administration of the laws of involuntary commitment are not meant to reflect on
the integrity of those charged with administering the law, nor are they meant to
imply that these persons are not seeking conscientiously to perform a thorough job in
what is frequently a difficult and frustrating area, These criticisms simply reflect
the honest opinions of a newcomer to the process, based on approximately three
months observation.
60
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-2(3)(d) (Supp. 1965).
61
1d. § 71-1-3(2) (Supp. 1965).
62 Id. § 71-1-4 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1969).
63
Id. § 71-1-5(3) (Supp. 1965), as amended (Supp. 1969).
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B. Five Day "Hold" Under Voluntary Hospitalization Statute
It seems contradictory that an individual can at one and
the same time be a voluntary and an involuntary hospital patient. The voluntary hospitalization statute, however, allows
any hospital to detain a voluntarily admitted patient who is
mentally ill, mentally deficient, or displays symptoms of mental
ilness or mental deficiency. Such detention comprises a period
of five days after a required written request for release has
been filed with the administrative office of the hospital by
the patient himself, his legal guardian, parent, spouse, or adult
next of kin. This, could, in practice, exceed five days, since
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays are exempted from the com64
putation of days.
C. The Emergency Detention Procedure
The emergency procedure permits any sheriff or peace
officer to take into protective custody and place in a suitable
place of confinement any individual whom the sheriff or officer
believes, in good faith, to be mentally ill or mentally deficient6"

and apt to injure or endanger himself or others if allowed to
remain at liberty.66 Immediately after taking such a person
into custody, the detaining officer is required to file a statement with the district or probate court of the county where
the person is taken into custody setting forth the circumstances
of the detention and giving the reasons for his belief about
641d. § 71-1-2(3)(a) (1963).
65

6

The terms "mentally ill" and "mentally deficient" recur throughout chapter 71 of
the Colorado statutes and are crucial terms in the involuntary commitment statute,
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-5 (1963). They are defined in section 1:
(b) "Mentally ill person" shall mean a person afflicted with disease,
infirmity, old age, or disorder, which impairs his mental or emotional
functions to a degree sufficient to require protection, supervision, treatment,
or confinement, for his own welfare or for the welfare or safety of others,
or who, by reason thereof, lacks sufficient control, judgment, and discretion
to manage his own property or affairs. The terms, "insane person," "mental
incompetent" or "lunatic," shall hereafter be deemed to mean and be
included within the words, "mentally ill person," within the present statutes
of the state of Colorado, unless context otherwise indicates a mentally
deficient person.
(c) "Mentally deficient person" shall mean a person whose intellectual
functions have been deficient since birth or whose intellectual development
has been arrested or impaired by disease, or physical injury to such an
extent that he lacks sufficient control, judgment, and discretion to manage
his property or affairs, or who by reason of this deficiency, for his own
welfare, or the welfare or safety of others, requires protection, supervision,
guidance, training, control, or care. The terms, "idiot," "feebleminded
person," "mental incompetent," or "weak-minded person," shall hereafter
be deemed to mean and be included within the words "mentally deficient
person," within the present statutes of the state of Colorado, unless the
context otherwise indicates a mentally ill person.
COLO. REV.STAT. ANN. § 71-1-1(b) & (c) (1963).
Id. § 71-1-3(1) (1963).
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the individual's condition.6" Failure to file a timely and proper
report has formed the basis for civil liability for false arrest
in at least one case. 68
Within 24 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays) after the filing of the report, the court is required
to issue a written order either discharging the individual, confining him for observation, diagnosis, or treatment in accordance with the terms of the short term involuntary hospitalization statute, or referring the matter to a medical commission
as though a petition had been filed under the indefinite term
involuntary commitment and adjudication statute.6 0
D. Short Term Involuntary Hospitalization
1. In General
The short term hospitalization statute allows the court to
order an individual to be confined for observation, diagnosis,
and treatment of mental illness for three months, 0 a period
which can be extended by the court for an additional three
months whenever it appears from the written statements of the
attending physician or the director of the hospital that the
original three month period is insufficient to accomplish the
purposes of the hospitalization. 7 Notice of such extension must
be given the respondent and his guardian ad litem.72 The total
period of confinement cannot exceed six months from the date
of the original hospitalization order. 3
2. Initiation of Proceeding by Petition, Physician's State-

ment and District Attorney's Statement of Probable
Cause
Any reputable person may institute a short term hospitalization proceeding against another individual, who under the
terms of the statute is called the "respondent." 7 He can do
so by submitting a verified petition to the court of jurisdiction
in the county where the respondent resides or is physically
present, alleging that it would be in the respondent's best interest to be hospitalized for the previously mentioned statu67

Id. § 71-1-3(2)

(1963).

68 Denver Post, Oct. 26, 1967, at 32, col. 1.
69

§ 71-1-3(3)(a-d)
71-1-4(4) (Supp. 1965).

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

70 1d. §

71Id. § 71-1-4(8) (Supp. 1965).
2

7

Id.

73Id.
74

1d. §

71-1-20

(1963).

(1963).
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torily prescribed purposes. The petition must be accompanied
by a statement from a licensed physician also alleging that
such observation, diagnosis, and treatment would be in the
best interest of the respondent, giving the doctor's reasons
for the allegation and also giving the dates when he has
examined the respondent. Finally, a statement of probable
cause for the issuance of an order of hospitalization must be
supplied by the district attorney or, in counties exceeding three
hundred thousand in population, by the county attorney or
by their assistants.75
In practice, the physician's letter and the statement of
probable cause required by this statute serve an extremely perfunctory purpose. In Denver, petitions and physicians' letters
generally receive careful scrutiny by either of two veteran city
attorneys assigned to the mental health division of the city
attorney's office to insure that the statutorily prescribed contents are present. If these contents are present, the attorneys
believe that the requirement of "probable cause" is satisfied.
They do not appear to conduct a more extensive investigation,
such as telephoning the physician submitting the letter before
issuing a statement of probable cause - one stated reason being
that they are not psychiatrists, and therefore should concern
themselves only with the statutory requirements.
In Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties, the district attorney's
offices, perhaps because of a lack of sufficient personnel and
resources, pay scant attention to mental health matters. District
attorneys seldom see a petition or physician's statement, but
the district attorney's offices routinely issue a statement of
probable cause on the advice of the clerks who handle mental
health matters in the district court clerk's offices. In Jefferson
County, the clerk further facilitates and standardizes the prehospitalization process by issuing uniform printed statement
forms to physicians.
3. Five Day Waiver of Physician's Statement and
Statement of Probable Cause
If the court receives a satisfactory showing that emergency circumstances make it essential for the respondent to
be immediately hospitalized and that it would be unsafe or
dangerous for the respondent himself or others if he were
to remain at large, the court is empowered to waive the requirement of a physician's and district attorney's statement
75

1d. § 71-1-4(1) (Supp. 1965).
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for a period not exceeding five days after the issuance of the
order of hospitalization. 6
4. Alternative Ways of Instituting a Short Term
Proceeding
a. By a hospitaladministratorproceeding under either
short term or long term statute
Short term hospitalization proceeding may be initiated by
the officer or attending physician of a hospital in the case of
a voluntarily admitted patient whose release would, in the
written opinion of the doctor or administrator, be unsafe or
dangerous for himself or others. This written opinion must be
submitted to the court of jurisdiction in the county where the
hospital is located within five days (Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays exluded) after the patient files a written request for
release with the administrative office of the hospital. Upon
receiving such an opinion the court may proceed either under
the provisions of the short term hospitalization statute or the
77
indefinite term involuntary commitment statute.
b. By a medical commission
Short term hospitalization proceedings may also be commenced by a medical commission. The commission, which is
entrusted with the responsibility of deciding the merits of petitions filed under the involuntary commitment statute, is empowered to recommend short term hospitalization as one of
its three options (the others are discharge or adjudication),
when considering the case of a respondent in an involuntary
commitment proceeding. 8
I learned of only one medical commission hearing which
exercised this option. In this case, the recommendation of short
term hospitalization appeared to be the result of a compromise
between the commission and the legal aid attorney representing the respondent.
Describing the hearing an hour later at his office, the
legal aid attorney stated that the respondent's small three room
house in which the hearing was held was continuously filled
with cacophony as a half dozen conversations raged simultaneously. Finally, after everyone had strolled through the
rooms cluttered with books and knic-knacs, the member of
the commission who was a psychiatrist announced, "He's obvi76Id.
77d. § 71-1-4(2) and § 71-1-2(3)(d) (Supp. 1965).
78
d. § 71-1-4(4) and § 71-1-7(3) (Supp. 1965).
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ously paranoic." The aged doctor then turned to the respondent's attorney and asked, "What will you do if we adjudicate
[the respondent]?"

"We'll probably demand a jury trial."
"O.K., well, in that case we'll recommend short term
hospitalization." The hearing then ended.
c. By a court pursuant to emergency detention
procedure provisions and on its own motion.
As previously mentioned, the court can institute a short
term hospitalization proceeding as one of its three options in
dealing with a person held pursuant to the emergency detention statute.79 Also, although the statutes do not specifically
provide for such a procedure, the Denver Probate Court and
the District Court for Arapahoe County will on occasion issue
a short term hospitalization order on motion of the court when
a satisfactory showing is made that it would be in the best interest of a given person to be hospitalized, but for some reason
a petitioner and a physician to furnish the required statement
are unavailable. Hospitalization orders on the court's own motion are frequently issued at the request of the welfare department or some other public agency.
5. Guardian Ad Litem and His Duties
The court is required to appoint an attorney to serve as
guardian ad litem for the respondent whenever a request for
an order of short term hospitalization is filed. The guardian
ad litem must be furnished with a copy of the hospitalization
order within two days after its entry. He is charged with three
duties: (1) to make such investigation as may be necessary to
protect the interests of the respondent; (2) to make certain
that the respondent is advised of his right to a hearing either
by a medical commission or by a court; and (3) to report the
results of his investigation to the court as soon as possible,
but no later than five days after the entry of the hospitalization order, unless the court extends the time.8 °
Guardians ad litem in short term hospitalization cases are
theoretically chosen from the entire rosters of the respective
county bar associations. In practice, the attorneys appointed
are generally those who have informed the court clerks of their
desire to receive court appointments. These are frequently
lawyers recently admitted to practice.
79

id.§ 71-1-4(7)

(Supp. 1965).

8OId. § 71-1-4(3). A reasonable extension of time is generally granted as a matter of

course.
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In Denver, guardians ad litem in short term hospitalization cases are paid a flat fee of twenty-five dollars per case,
plus twenty-five dollars per hour for additional work performed
of an extraordinary nature, as reflected in the case record.
If a court review is requested, the attorney appointed as
guardian ad litem in the short term hospitalization may represent the respondent in court. If review by a medical commission is requested, however, the guardian ad litem appointed
to serve with the medical commission assigned to conduct the
review represents the respondent. Medical commissions frequently review "hold and treat" orders"1 as part of a normal
afternoon caseload.
In Jefferson County I was permitted to view some representative files in both short term hospitalization and involuntary commitment cases. The required forms and reports were
all present and were neatly filled in.
The reports of the guardians ad litem in short term hospitalization cases were particularly interesting. Most of these
were exceedingly brief statements simply showing that the
minimum statutory duties had been performed. They indicated
that the attorney had spoken with the respondent, checked for
proper service of process, and had advised the respondent of
his right to a hearing. A few such reports indicated that the
respondent contemplated a request for a hearing. The files did
not indicate whether a hearing had ever subsequently been held.
In only a few cases had a guardian ad litem filed a demand for a court review on behalf of a respondent. A young
attorney who had served several times as a guardian ad litern
in short term hospitalization cases informed me that most attorneys he knew felt that the guardian ad litem fee did not justify
going beyond the bare statutory requirements.
A court clerk informed me that if a guardian ad litem did
perform work beyond the minimum specified duties, he could
petition the court for additional compensation. The attorney
stated, however, that he had never been informed of this practice by anyone in the court, and that he believed that the mental
health division and the court itself generally looked with disfavor on an attorney who worked beyond the statutory requirements minimum. The attorney's viewpoint was confirmed by
81 The hospitalization order entered pursuant to the provisions of the short tern involuntary hospitalization statute is referred to by those professionally involved with the
process as a "hold and treat" order.
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the court clerk who stated that judges for whom she had served
had generally considered the simple compliance with the statutory duties, not extensive investigation and frequent requests
for hearings, to be the proper role of the guardian ad liten.
6. Place of Hospitalization
If the requirements for short term involuntary hospitalization are met, 82 the court is empowered to issue an order committing the respondent to the department of institutions for
placement in a state institution, or an order committing him
to some other hospital, including a federal hospital, if he is
administratively certified to be eligible by an appropriate federal agency for a period of three months. As previously mentioned, this time period can, under appropriate circumstances,
be extended for an additional three month period. The department of institutions is required to inform the court of the
specific institution to which respondents committed to its charge
shall be sent.13 Fort Logan Mental Health Center is the facility
to which all respondents, except those requiring maximum
security conditions, in Denver, Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties
are sent.
7. Hospitalization Order
The hospitalization order (referred to as a "hold and
treat" order by those professionally involved with the process),
must direct the sheriff or some responsible person to deliver
the respondent to the designated hospital. The person taking
the respondent to the hospital must personally serve a copy of
the order on the respondent.8 4 The respondent must also be
given a written notice of his right to a hearing concerning his
hospitalization before a medical commission or the court. In
case the respondent is already a patient in the hospital of confinement specified in the order, the court must appoint an
appropriate person to serve the order and notice of the right
to hearing on the respondent within two days after the issuance
of the order. Whoever serves the order and notice is required
to make a written return to the court that the duties have been
performed.85
For the requirements for short term involuntary hospitalization, see text accompanying
notes 74 and 75 supra. Upon a "satisfactory showing" that it would be in the
respondent's best interest to be confined in an institution, the court is empowered
to issue the hospitalization order. COMO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-4(1 ) (Supp. 1965).
83
1d. § 71-1-4(4) (Supp. 1965).
-Id. § 71-1-4(5) (Supp. 1965).
82

id.
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8. Review of Hospitalization Order by Court or Medical
Commission
The respondent or his guardian ad litern may file a written
request for review of the hospitalization order either by a
medical commission or by the court. They may also in like
manner request that the observation and treatment be conducted
on an outpatient basis or in a nursing home. If the hospitalization order was made upon the recommendation of a medical
commission, review of this order must be by the court. If a
court review is requested or mandatory, the court must provide
a hearing within ten days of the request, and must give notice
of the time and place of the hearing to the respondent, the
guardian ad litem and the district attorney. At the conclusion
of the hearing the court may exercise any of the following
options: (1) enter or confirm a hospitalization order; (2) discharge the respondent; (3) refer the matter to a medical commission; or (4) enter any other suitable order.8 6
There appears to be substantial constitutional objections
to the third alternative. In asking for a court review of his
hospitalization order, the respondent wants to test the validity
of the hospitalization order and the validity of his confinement
under the order. He is certainly not seeking to have himself
adjudicated mentally incompetent and committed for an indefinite term. By requesting a court review, the respondent
does in fact subject himself to the possibility of this latter fate
under the provisions of the statute allowing the court to refer
the matter to a medical commission. A medical commission
seems to have the statutorily prescribed power to recommend
adjudication and commitment for an indefinite term.8 7 The
court appears to be bound to follow medical commission recommendations.s" The option is thus violative of due process in
that a greater deprivation can ultimately result from review
than from the original hospitalization order itself. This makes a
review an extremely hazardous venture for a respondent under
a "hold and treat" order.
Two court hearings reviewing short term hospitalization
orders were observed-one in Arapahoe, the other in Jefferson County. Both hearings were conducted in a highly orderly
86

Id. § 71-1-4(6) (Supp. 1965).

87 Id.

§ 71-1-7(3)

(Supp. 1965). The Denver Probate Court, however, takes the posi-

tion that the medical commission does not have the power to adjudicate. See text,
p. 551 infra.
88Id. § 71-1-11(1) (Supp. 1965). The relevant section of the statute is quoted in note
130 infra.

1969

CIVIL COMMITMENT IN COLORADO

and dignified manner, and the judges showed genuine concern
and displayed great courtesy toward the respondents.
Still, I could not escape the feeling that the hearings (in
essence the laws) were weighted against the respondents from
the start - that they stood virtually no chance of being released from the hospitalization orders and that the hearings
offered them simply a forum in which to "speak out" without
any real possibility of gaining the relief requested.
One facet of the hearings, in particular, contributed to
this feeling. In both hearings, the psychiatrists appearing on
behalf of Fort Logan testified that neither of the respondents
constituted a physical danger either to others or to themselves.
Of course, the short term hospitalization statute does not require a showing that the respondent present such a danger
but merely requires that it be "in the best interest" of the respondent to be hospitalized. But who should be the judge of
"best interest?" What criteria should be followed in determining the nature of a respondent's "best interest?"
In both hearings, it was clear that the judges decided these
questions by relying almost entirely on the testimony of the
psychiatrists in reaching their decisions. The Jefferson County
Judge made this fact explicit in rendering his decision: "I have
now heard all the testimony and am required to render a decision. Although not legally bound to do so, as a practical matter, I must follow the opinion of the experts in cases like this.
The hospitalization order will be continued." Psychiatrists testifying in hearings reviewing hospitalization orders often represent, whether directly or indirectly, Fort Logan or some other
receiving institution. If they did not favor continuance of hospitalization, they wouldn't appear. They would instead petition
the court to release the respondent. This procedure affords the
respondent little opportunity to procure independent psychiatric examination and testimony on his behalf.
9. Attending Physician's Report
Upon the motion of the guardian ad litem the court must
issue an order requiring the doctor attending the respondent
to submit a report to the court within ten days thereafter detailing the results of his examination to that date. The court
may also order this on its own motion. Upon receipt of such
a report the court has three options: (1) to continue the original hospitalization; (2) to discharge the respondent, if the
examining doctor so recommends; or (3) to institute involun-
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tary commitment proceedings pursuant to the involuntary commitment statute.8 9
10. Release from Hospitalization
Whenever the court receives a satisfactory showing (such
as by medical reports) that the respondent has received maximum benefit from treatment, that he is mentally competent,
and that it would be in his best interest to be released, the
court is required to immediately enter an order releasing him
from hospitalization. The court clerk must notify the guardian
ad litem of this order."0 The provision for this statute requiring "mental competency" as a condition for release from a
short term hospitalization order is curious, since "mental incompetency" is not required for short term involuntary hospitalization. In Colorado "mental incompetency" means that a
medical commission has recommended that an individual be
adjudicated "mentally ill" or "mentally deficient" and that
the court has done so.9 1 Without such an adjudication, no presumption of "mental incompetency" can arise9 2 and consequently a respondent in a short term hospitalization proceeding would be presumed to be "mentally competent" at every
stage of such a proceeding. Thus, the provision appears to be
devoid of meaning.
11. Records
Records in short term proceedings must be maintained
separately by the court clerk. If the respondent is released from
the hospitalization order, his file must be sealed and his name
omitted from the indices of the court until the court orders it
opened upon a showing of good cause or until the respondent
has been adjudicated pursuant to the involuntary commitment
statute. If a petition is filed under the latter statute, the file
89 Id. § 71-1-4(7) (Supp. 1965).
90
1d. § 71-1-4(10) (Supp. 1965).
91

See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-1(b) (1963); § 71-1-5 (Supp. 1965); § 71-1-7
(Supp. 1965); § 71-1-11 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1965); § 71-1-23 (1963),
as amended (Supp. 1965); and § 153-1-1(7) (1963). The precise meaning of

mental incompetency is somewhat unclear. Section 71-1-23(1) seems to imply that
an individual can only be considered to be a mental incompetent if he has been
adjudicated mentally ill or mentally deficient. Section 153-1-1(7), part of the
definitional section in the chapter and article dealing with wills, estates, and heirship,
defines a mental incompetent in the following manner:
"Mental incompetent," "incompetent person," "incompetent," or "mentally
ill person" denotes a person who has been adjudicated mentally ill or
mentally deficient, or who by the laws of this state is designated as a
lunatic, insane person, incompetent, mental incompetent, incapable or feebleminded, or who has been found in an appropriate proceeding to be unable
or unfit to manage his own property.
92

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-1-1(7)
1d. § 71-1-23(1) (1963).

(1963).
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may be opened and made part of the long term commitment
case, and the respondent's name may be indexed. 3
E. Involuntary Civil Commitment for an Indefinite Term

The involuntary commitment process (often referred to
by those involved with it as "long term adjudication" as opposed to the short term hospitalization's informal label "hold
and treat") presents the most serious consequences for a respondent. Under the relevant statutory provisions he may be
confined (or at a minimum, subjected to confinement) for an
indefinite, perhaps interminable, period of time and can lose
several rights under the law which he would otherwise enjoy. 4
1. Initiation of Proceeding by Petition and Physician's
Statement
Any reputable person can institute involuntary commitment proceedings by filing with the court of jurisdiction a
verified petition alleging that any person, then physically present in the county, is mentally ill or deficient, and requesting
that a hearing be held before a medical commission. This petition must be accompanied by a statement from a licensed physician which says that the respondent is mentally ill or mentally
deficient, states whether the physician has examined the respondent, and gives the date of any examination. 5
2. Custody of Respondent Pending Medical Commission
Hearing
Upon receipt of the petition and physician's statement, the
court may issue an order directing any person to take the respondent into custody, pending determination of his mental
condition by the commission. The court can also issue such an
order on its own motion if it has good cause to believe that
a person is mentally ill or deficient.9 " Orders on the court's
own motion are frequently entered in response to requests by
the welfare department or some other public agency.

Pending determination of a respondent's mental condition,
the court must place him in the custody of some relative or
other proper person, or the department of institutions for placement in a state hospital or some hospital or suitable place not
under the supervision of the department of institutions. No
93ld. § 71-1-4(12) (Supp. 1965).
94
See Id.§ 71-1-11(1) & (2) (Supp. 1965). See also Appendix.
951d. § 71-1-5(1) (Supp. 1965).

96 Id.
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person held pursuant to an involuntary commitment proceeding may be confined in a jail unless a satisfactory showing is
made that he is violent and dangerous to himself or others, or
that there is no other adequate place of custody in the county. 7
3. Jurisdiction and Venue
Normally the court in which the petition is filed has jurisdiction over the proceeding and appoints the medical commission. The court of original jurisdiction, however, may order
the matter to be transferred to a court of another jurisdiction.
If the respondent or his guardian ad litem files a written petition any time before the first hearing of the medical commission, requesting that the hearing be held in the county of
respondent's residence, the court is required to enter an order
transferring the case to the county of the respondent's residence.
In such a case, the court must enter a further order returning
the respondent to his county of residence for confinement in
a suitable place pending further proceedings. 8
4. Guardian Ad Litem
Whenever involuntary commitment proceedings are instituted, the court is required to appoint an attorney as guardian
ad litern for the respondent.9 A copy of the petition and any
order detaining the respondent pending inquiry by the medical
commission must be personally served upon the guardian ad
litem at least two days prior to any hearing before the medical
commission and within five days after issuance of the order."' 0
He also must be given at least two days notice of the time and
place of the first meeting of the medical commission. 10' Interpreting a prior statute containing a notice provision identical
to this present one, the Colorado Supreme Court held in the
case of Hultquist v. People that the giving of this notice was
mandatory and couldn't be waived by the guardian ad litem. 1 0 2
5. Duties of Guardian Ad Litem
The guardian ad litem is charged with two duties in an
involuntary commitment proceeding. He is required to attend
all meetings of the medical commission,10 3 and he is required
to file a written report with the court within five days after
97
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(Supp. 1965).
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1d. § 71-1-10 (Supp. 1965).
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1d. § 71-1-8(1) (1963).
I°Id. § 71-1-5(1) (Supp. 1965).
101 Id. § 71-1-8(1) (Supp. 1963).
10277 Colo. 310, 236 P. 997 (1925).
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the medical commission files its report. The report must show
the occupation, citizenship and residence of the respondent, his
length of residence in Colorado, and his previous place of residence, if known. It must also give the petitioner's name and
address and state his relationship to the respondent. The names
of any witnesses examined at the hearing must also be included."' If the medical commission finds a respondent to be
mentally ill or deficient, the guardian ad litem must include
the following additional items of information in his report:
(1) an inventory of any real or personal property believed to be owned by the respondent;
(2) the respondent's social security number;
(3) a list of any social security or other benefits to which
the respondent is entitled;
(4) the names and addresses of the respondent's next of
kin, if known;
(5) a recommendation as to whether a conservator should
be appointed.
The court must forward a copy of this report to the hospital where the respondent may be confined. 1 5 In Huhquist,
the Colorado Supreme Court elaborated somewhat on the statutorily prescribed duties of the guardian ad litem by declaring
that the purpose of the two day notice was to enable the attorney to make an adequate investigation and preparation to protect the interests of the respondent at the medical commission
hearing.10 6
In Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties, guardians ad litem
for involuntary commitment proceedings, like those in short
term hospitalization cases, are selected from the entire roster
of the respective county bar associations. In Denver, however,
guardians ad litein for involuntary civil commitment proceedings are generally chosen from a list of only about six attorneys.
Most of these lawyers have been serving continuously in this
capacity for the past two decades or longer, and are sixty years
of age or older. They are paid ten dollars for each case and
are guaranteed fifty dollars for an afternoon's work regardless
of the number of cases.
6. Appointment of a Medical Commission
Whenever an involuntary commitment petition is filed,
the court is required to appoint a medical commission to deter104ld. § 71-1-8(2) (1963).
106 Id. § 71-1-8(3) (1963).
1o6 Hultquist v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 316, 236 P. 997, 999 (1925).
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mine whether the respondent is mentally ill or deficient. A
commission must be comprised of two medical doctors licensed
to practice medicine in Colorado. They are not required to be
residents of the county of appointment, but they cannot be
related to the respondent or petitioner, nor are they allowed
to have any financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding.1 °7 In Denver the judge of the court has generally been
making his appointments from the same panel of physicians
for the past two decades or longer. The panel from which
medical commissioners are appointed consists of about twelve
physicians most of whom are psychiatrists (there is one neurologist), and most range in age from about sixty-five to eighty.
In Jefferson County non-psychiatrists alone are chosen to
serve on medical commissions. A clerk in charge of mental
health proceedings stated that the psychiatrists in the county
are generally unwilling to serve, considering such service to be
an intolerably unremunerative interference with private practice. Thus, she had simply stopped asking psychiatrists to serve.
Until several months ago medical commissioners received fifteen dollars per case for their services. Now they receive twentyfive dollars per case. Rarely is more than one case considered
in a single day.
Medical commissioners in Arapahoe County are chosen
supposedly from the entire roster of the county medical association. The list, as a practical matter, has been narrowed to
about two dozen physicians, since a great many doctors have
repeatedly refused to serve as commissioners or otherwise indicated their lack of desire to serve. Few physicians, even of those
who consent to serve, are eager to serve, considering such service to be an intolerably unremunerative interference with private practice. Usually the deputy clerk attempts to obtain one
psychiatrist and one general practioner or specialist in some
other field for each commission. They are paid twenty-five
dollars per case for their services and rarely will see more than
one respondent on one day.
7. Notice of Medical Commission Hearing
Upon appointment of the commission the judge must immediately fix by written order a time and place for the first
hearing of the commission. Notice of this hearing must be personally served on the respondent at least five days (including
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) before the hearing.' 0 8 The
107 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-6(1)
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commission hearings must be held in the county where the petition is filed unless the court orders the commission to sit at
some other place in the state.1 °9
Although no cases have arisen involving the notice requirements of the present hospitalization and commitment statutes,
in dealing with the predecessors to the current statutes, the court
has repeatedly reiterated the position that:
(1) The court receives its jurisdiction exclusively from the
statutory provisions;
(2) Since the statutes are in derogation of the common
law, the requirements of the statutes must be strictly
construed;
(3) The court exercises valid jurisdiction only when the
statutory requirements are strictly followed; otherwise
110
its orders are void.
Thus, an alteration of a court order by a sheriff so that
it showed a place of confinement and a time and place for the
first meeting of the medical commission different from those
specified in the order of the court was held to nullify a subsequent order of adjudication. 1 The failure to clearly prove
proper service of notice on the respondent has also resulted in
1 2
reversal of an order of adjudication.1
8. District Attorney to Conduct Proceedings
The law requires that all commitment proceedings be conducted by the district attorney or by the county attorney, if the
county's population exceeds 300,000, or by a qualified attorney
acting for these officials who is appointed for that purpose by
the court of jurisdiction. 1"' This provision would seem to encompass medical commission hearings. The Arapahoe County
District Court and District Attorney's office, however, apparently take the view that this provision does not apply to such
hearings. No representative from the district attorney's office
was present at the two medical commissions I attended in
Arapahoe County, and, according to an official who deals with
mental health matters in the district court clerk's office, the
court policy is not to require the presence of the district attor10 9 1d. § 71-1-6(3)

(1963).

11 See, e.g., Young v. Brofman, 139 Colo. 296, 338 P.2d 286 (1959) ; Rickey v. People,
129 Colo. 174, 267 P.2d 1021 (1954) ; Kendall v. People, 126 Colo. 573, 252 P.2d
91 (1952) ; Okerberg v. People, 119 Colo. 529, 205 P.2d 224 (1949).
Ill 1werks v. People, 120 Colo. 86, 273 P.2d 133 (1954). See also Barber v. People,
127 Colo. 90, 254 P.2d 431 (1953).
112Okerberg v. People, 119 Colo. 529, 205 P.2d 224 (1949).
113 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-9 (Supp. 1965).
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ney or his appointed representative at commission hearings.
9. Medical Commission Procedure
a. Hearing
The medical commission is empowered to administer oaths.
It is required to receive evidence, as well as any statements
offered by the respondent, his own attorney, or his guardian
ad litem. The commission may examine hospital and medical
reports and records. It may examine witnesses."1 At the request of the medical commission, the guardian ad liten, the
respondent's privately retained counsel, or the attorney acting
for the county, the court is required to issue subpoenas compelling in the presence of witnesses or the production of records
before the commission at its hearings."'
b. Report
The commission is required to make such investigation
and inquiry as it deems fit, and may adjourn the hearing to a
time and place certain. 1 Unless the court grants an extension
of time, the commission is required to file a verified report of
its findings, based upon the facts considered, with the court
within 48 hours after the conclusion of the hearing. These
findings are to be made in answer to the following questions:
(1) Is the respondent afflicted with a disease, infirmity,
old age, or disorder, which impairs his mental or
emotional functions to a degree sufficient to require
protection, supervision, treatment, or confinement for
his own welfare or the welfare or safety of others?
(2) Does the respondent, by reason of mental illness, lack
sufficient control, judgment and discretion to manage
his own property or affairs?
(3) Are the respondent's intellectual functions so deficient, arrested, or impaired by disease or physical
injury that he lacks sufficient control, judgment, and
discretion to manage his property or affairs?
(4) Are the respondent's intellectual functions so deficient, arrested, or impaired that for his own welfare,
114

1d. § 71-1-7(1) (1963). The Supreme Court of Colorado has stressed that a proceeding under the commitment laws is a special statutory proceeding neither criminal
nor civil in nature Kendall v. People, 126 Colo. 573, 252 P.2d 91 (1952) ; Hultquist
v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 995 (1925). Because of their special nature, their
sole aim being to benefit the respondent, the court has held the testimonial privilege
statutes to be inapplicable to commitment proceedings. See Hawkyard v. People,
115 Colo. 35, 169 P.2d 178 (1946).
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COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-7(1) (1963).
116 Id.
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or the welfare or safety of others, he requires protection, supervision, guidance, training, control, or
care?' 1 7
Although not free from ambiguity, the first two questions
are generally interpreted by the attorneys for the counties and
the medical commissioners as referring to mental illness and
the last two as referring to mental deficiency. Thus, if a commission finds a respondent to be mentally ill, it will answer
one or, in most cases, both of the first two questions in the
affirmative and the last two in the negative. Some commissioners, apparently uninstructed in the distinction between the
two pairs of questions, answer all questions in the affirmative.
If any of the questions are answered affirmatively, the
commission report must also give the following information:
(1) name, age, sex, and nativity of the respondent; and (2)
names and addresses of his parents, spouse and children to the
extent these are ascertainable. The commission is further required to recommend a suitable place for commitment and can
recommend conditions applying to such commitment.1 18
In Denver and Jefferson Counties, I was allowed to view
a great number of medical commission reports filed over the
past several years. The standardized form reports were generally filled out in a perfunctory manner. The first two questions were generally answered "yes," and the last two, "no."
The diagnosis would generally be given in two or three words.
Generally, the space after the word "recommendations" was
left totally blank. In cases where some recommendation was
made, it consisted of a terse statement such as, "keep at nursing home."
c. Cases concerning medical commission procedure
The Colorado Supreme Court has directed no real scrutiny
at the functioning of a medical commission, and hence no judicial standards have evolved to expand on or to clarify the
vague statutory provisions regarding medical commission procedure. In a pair of cases arising under earlier statutes with
different provisions for medical commission findings, the court,
in dictum, criticized medical commission reports as being ambiguous and contradictory." 9
In the Kendall case, the court, after finding the report of
the medical commission to be contradictory, stated: "A finding
117Id. § 71-1-7(2) (1963).
118Id. § 71-1-7(3) (Supp. 1965).
119 Rickey v. People, 129 Colo. 174, 178, 267 P.2d 1021, 1024 (1954); Kendall v.
People, 126 Colo. 573, 577, 252 P.2d 91, 93 (1952).
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by the commission should be for the protection of the respondent as well as society, specific, and not be an all-inclusive
finding that could leave its stigma upon respondent throughout life."' 2 ° This language, which is at the same time both bold
and puzzling, has not been developed in any other cases. The
typical approach toward commission action is represented by
Hawkyard v. People. 2' In this case the court refused to consider an allegation of error charging defects in a medical commission hearing because the record was silent concerning such
a defect, and the trial court had found the hearing to be regular.' 22 The court stated that in such a case it would presume
23
the regularity of a commission hearing.
d. Medical commission procedure in practice
When a medical commission is convened, it is provided
with three alternative courses of action. It may recommend (1)
discharge,' 2 4 (2) short term hospitalization 1 25 or (3) adjudication.' 2 6 If a medical commission finds a respondent mentally
ill or deficient and recommends adjudication and commitment,
the court seems to be bound by statute to follow the commission's findings and recommendations and enter an order adjudicating the respondent mentally ill or deficient and provid127
ing for his commitment or custody.
Medical commissions for a variety of reasons, are rarely
appointed in Jefferson County. I sensed in my interview with
a clerk who dealt with mental health matters that the court
and the district attorney's office have a strong aversion to medical commission hearings. In their view, the hearings deplete
the court's budget and waste the time of the district attorney's
staff. A member of the district attorney's staff indicated that
such hearings are generally quite perfunctory in nature.
A clerk of the court stated that she believed that a medical
commission should be convened only as a last resort. The court
has the power by order to temporarily hospitalize a person,
although it may not affect his assets in this procedure. The
clerk stated that if a respondent's difficulty consisted exclusively of a mental problem, therefore, and did not involve the
120
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conservation of his assets, he is never ordered to appear before
a medical commission as a first step. Instead, short term hospitalization is ordered. In most cases, she reported, further compulsory care beyond that permitted under a "hold and treat"
order is unnecessary.
Where the major problem involves the necessity of providing someone to manage the respondent's estate, the clerk
stated that she initially counseled prospective petitioners to
investigate the possibility of petitioning the court for the appointment of a voluntary guardian.' 2 8 In many cases this course
has provided a satisfactory solution.
In Denver, the city attorneys seem less eager to seek voluntary guardianship for a prospective respondent. They reason
that if an individual needs a guardian it generally won't be
long before he will require some form of compulsory care.
Thus, they believe that it is better to handle the matter in a
single proceeding.
When a medical commission is convened, the actual internal hearing procedure is apparently left to the discretion
of the commission itself." 9 In order to gain an insight into
medical commission procedure in actual practice, I observed
several medical commission hearings in each of the three counties studied. A few of these observations will be detailed here.
One or two afternoons every week, an unusual group of
men makes its way to several Denver area hospitals, nursing
homes, and sanitoriums. The group consists of two psychiatrists, a city attorney, an attorney in private practice, and their
chauffeur (who is the court baliff). The two psychiatrists comprise a medical commission duly appointed by the judge of the
probate court. The psychiatrists have served on many such commissions during the past two or three decades.
The city attorney is one of the two city attorneys assigned
to the mental health division. According to law, he is supposed
to conduct the hearings of the commission. The private practitioner has been appointed, as he was on countless previous
occasions during his legal career, to serve as guardian ad litem
for all of the respondents in the hearings to be conducted by
the commission that day.
The psychiatrists, the attorneys, and their driver know
each other well. During their rounds they converse amiably,
frequently kid each other, and, in general, exude a team feeling.
128 Id. § 71-1-8 (1963).
129
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The commission meets at noon prior to commission hearings
to review all records in cases heard that afternoon.
On my first day of observation, the first of the four hearings was scheduled at Veterans Hospital. The second was to
be held at Mt. Airy Sanitorium and the final hearings were to
take place at Fort Logan. The hearings were scheduled onehalf hour apart. This period included time for a hearing as
well as travel time.
The first hearing at Fort Logan involved a large, heavily
bejeweled woman of about forty who, through the guardian
ad litem appointed pursuant to the short term hospitalization
statute, had requested a medical commission review of her temporary hospitalization order. We gathered around a long narrow table in a conference room.
The respondent and a staff psychiatrist, a middle-aged
woman, entered and set down near the middle of the table
facing the commission and the attorneys. A young man and
woman, later identified as staff social workers, seated themselves at one end of the table near the door.
One of the psychiatrist commissioners began the hearing.
"What's your diagnosis?"
The staff psychiatrist gave her diagnosis and the medical
commission members began filling in the forms in front of
them.
The other psychiatrist commissioner lifted his head and
inquired, "Should we take her driver's license away?" Although,
the Ft. Logan staff members stated that the patient did not
have a license, he repeated the question twice during the remainder of the hearing.
The patient, who was visibly angry, attempted to speak.
The commission members remained oblivious to her strongly
expressed protests. They were engaged in a discussion with the
city attorney concerning the proper method of filling in the
required forms. Finally, the staff psychiatrist asked, "Doesn't
she get a chance to say why she feels she shouldn't be under
our care? She requested this hearing. I thought she'd get a
chance to speak."
The guardian ad litem, who had been virtually silent up
to this point, then began to question the respondent intensely,
primarily concerning the number of her relatives living in the
Denver area and the way she got along with them. The members of the medical commission, the city attorney, and the driver
ignored the interrogation. They 'had become involved in a loud
dispute over the question of the commission's power to adjudi-
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cate the woman mentally ill. The commission members favored
adjudicating the woman. Their voices became louder.
Soon the guardian ad litem became perturbed, abruptly
stopped his questioning and faced his colleagues. "Dammit,
give me a chance to do my job, will you? I didn't bother you
when you were talking," he said forcefully.
"Well, hurry up," the medical commissioner replied, visibly annoyed by the interruption, "it's clear she doesn't have
an estate."
The guardian ad litem resumed his questioning and the
legal dispute continued for a few more minutes in a subdued
tone. It was finally conclusively settled by the city attorney.
"It's the judge's interpretation of the statute that a person
seeking a review of his hospitalization order shouldn't be adjudicated at this hearing."
The hearing then ended. The medical commission recommended continuation of the order of hospitalization. The patient, a somewhat befuddled look on her face, was gently
ushered out by the staff psychiatrist.
I attended a medical commission hearing in a small town
near Denver. The respondent was a sixty-four year old woman.
I rode to the hearing with a county welfare worker who moonlighted at night as a coroner's investigator. He had become
involved in the case when the respondent's seventy-five year
old husband, who was the petitioner in the matter, had become
severely ill a few months earlier and had been placed in a
Denver nursing home.
Upon arriving in the town we went to the office of the
respondent's physician, who had submitted the letter supporting the petition for involuntary hospitalization. Here we were
joined by the medical commission, composed of two psychiatrists and the guardian ad litem.
The respondent's doctor proceeded to give us a background
report on the respondent. He reported that she had grown up
in an orphanage, had been married twice and was sixty-four
years old. He believed that the woman was mentally retarded
and probably had always been so. He also stated that she had
become troublesome to the community, particularly since her
husband left. She pestered bank tellers, and the doctor had
heard reports that she had on one occasion attempted to direct
traffic while in the nude. He also heard that she had threatened
some school children with a shotgun the previous summer.
A discussion ensued regarding the best place- the doctor's office or the respondent's home-to see the respondent
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and the appropriate manner in which to approach her. It was
decided that her physician should accompany us to the respondent's home and make an introduction. The members of the
commission would then talk to her briefly at home, make a
tour of the premises and then ask the respondent to accompany
them to the office of the doctor, where they would conduct a
more intensive examination.
The medical commission, the guardian ad litem, the physician, the welfare worker, and I drove about five blocks to an
old wood structure which had at one time obviously been a
gas station and garage. We approached a large sliding door
on the side of the building. The guardian ad litem knocked.
In a few minutes the door opened and a slight, wrinkled old
woman neatly clad in a blue dress appeared. Her eyes moved
quickly over us and she exclaimed, "My, what a handsome
group of men! I've never seen the like of it in all my life."
"My, don't you look pretty yourself, Ann [not her real
name]," the guardian ad litem, who had never seen her before
responded cheerfully.
The psychiatrists introduced themselves as doctors, and
the guardian ad litem identified himself as an attorney. They
stated that they had come to see how she was doing. The respondent, who according to her physician had been served with
an order requiring her to appear before a medical commission
on the previous day, replied that she had been expecting us
and invited us inside.
The interior of this portion of the building had at one
time been the garage. The room appeared to be free of grease
and oil, but was dusty and dirty. The respondent pointed out
that she lived in a silver trailer which was parked on one side of
the room. She invited us to enter. Straight inside lay a tiny
alcove housing a small, made bed. To the left was a narrow
compartment containing a tiny gas-burning stove, a sink, some
cupboards, and a kerosene heater. It was quite warm inside.
The interior of the trailer, however, appeared to be neat and
clean.
After viewing the inside of the trailer, Ann escorted the
group to the front of the building where a clean bathroom
was located.
Outside, one of the medical commissioners said that he
had "seen enough." "The place is a public menace. No ventilation. She could asphyxiate in there. The stuffiness could well
be the cause of some of her mental problems." He then sniffed
the air immediately inside and outside the building, claiming
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to detect some foul odors. Although the building did not convey the antiseptic quality of, for example, a middle-class suburban home, its odors seemed to be well within the limits of
human toleration. The welfare worker informed me that Ann
and her husband had lived in the trailer inside the garage for
many years.
A few minutes later the guardian ad itemn and Ann came
walking out of the building. "Now you don't mind coming
with us over to your doctor's office, do you Ann?" the guardian
ad litern asked.
"No, I reckon not. I'll have to be back before noonhave a lot of work to do."
The attorney continued talking light-heartedly with the
respondent as we travelled the few short blocks to the physician's office.
At her doctor's office we were ushered to a large examination room in the back. The commissioners seated themselves
on the left side of the room. Using their attache cases for backing, they began to arrange and fill in their report forms. The
guardian ad liten placed a tape recorder on a small table near
the commission. Ann sat about 10 feet away facing the attorney
and commission. The welfare worker and I sat on a small bed
behind and to one side of the medical commission.
"Ann, we just want to ask you a few questions," began
one of the commissioners bringing his ballpoint pen to readiness. The doctors took turns asking the respondent questions.
She didn't know the date, nor could she identify the President
of the United States or the Governor of Colorado. On the other
hand, she recalled details of her personal life quite vividly.
She knew the name of the town where she lived, her birthdate,
and birth place. She knew that she had been married twice,
that her first husband was dead, and that her present husband
was in a Denver nursing home. After willingly responding to
the psychiatrists' continual questioning for about twenty minutes
the woman became irritated.
"Is is true that you threatened some of the school kids
with a gun last summer?" one commissioner asked sweetly.
"What are you asking all these damn fool questions for?"
she exploded, stirring briskly in the chair, her eyes glistening.
The doctor's ballpoint moved quickly and wrote "paranoic"
under the heading "Diagnosis." "We just want to help you,"
he replied soothingly.
"I'll bet you're a tryin' to send me to one o' them awful
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homes in the city. No sir, you ain't going to do it. I never done
what you just said; I don't have a gun."
The questioning stopped momentarily when respondent's
doctor came in and showed a chart to one commissioner. He
glanced briefly at the chart and said, "Hm, this clearly indicates cerebral arteriosclerosis." He made another notation on
the report form.
Resuming the questioning, the psychiatrists asked Ann if
she had any friends in the town.
"Well, my caretaker and his wife come by once a day.
They're my best friends. Of course, I've lived here for 20 years
and know all of the folks. I don't have a single enemy, I'll tell
you that."
The psychiatrists left the room to ask her doctor a few
questions. "Does Ann have a caretaker for her place?" they
asked.
The doctor informed them that Ann did not have a caretaker, but a couple did visit her and offer her some assistance
almost daily.
"I thought if there was someone who could take care of
her ...but they're not here. If they cared, they would've been

here," one commissioner said pensively to no one in particular.
"She's got to be taken out of that place. It's a firetrap.
It's inhuman," the other commissioner commented emphatically.
The guardian ad litem then proceeded to question Ann
closely about her financial condition, and soon learned the location of her bank accounts.
At this point a uniformed sheriff's sergeant entered the
front door of the office followed by a plainclothes officer.
"Is Ann here?" he asked. "We've got an order to take
her to the sheriff's department pending transfer to Fort Logan.
She has been adjudicated, hasn't she?"
The three doctors nodded affirmatively and directed the
officers toward the back room. The welfare worker and the
guardian ad litem attempted to coax Ann to enter the marked
sheriff's car which was already parked by the back door of the
office. The guardian ad litem repeatedly importuned: "We're
just going over to make sure your money is all right in the
bank." She angrily refused and attempted to walk toward the
front of the building. The stocky welfare worker and the tall,
husky sergeant grabbed her by her elbows and pulled her firmly
out the back door, her rigidly held feet bumping lightly on
the floor.
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During this time, the psychiatrists were busy completing
the medical commission report form. After completing this
task, one commissioner walked out into the sunlight and stood
beside me as we watched the struggle to place Ann in the back
seat of the sheriff's automobile.
In the process of struggling, the respondent's purse opened
and fell out of her hands into those of the plainclothes officer.
The officer and the guardian ad litem began examining the
contents of the purse and soon discovered some money. The
commissioner turned and said: "I hear that ambulance drivers
often make out real well in cases like this."
"About two hundred dollars here," the attorney exclaimed
as he counted. "Lord, I thought you didn't have any money
with you."
The plainclothes officer and welfare worker had succeeded
in placing Ann in the back seat by this time. The guardian
ad litem got out and the car sped away.
10. Order of Adjudication
The recommendation that a respondent be adjudicated
mentally ill or mentally deficient and be committed for an indefinite term does not, by itself, operate as an adjudication and
commitment. A court order of adjudication is necessary to
achieve this result. However, the court order appears to be
little more than a formality because the statute appears to require the court to follow the findings and recommendations
of the medical commission.' 8 ' This is in sharp contrast with
the role of the court in a proceeding to determine whether an
incompetent should be adjudicated competent. Even though
the restoration law requires that the respondent is examined
by two doctors and that they submit a report of their findings
to the court, the statute speaks of the court making its own
findings. 1 The case law interpreting an earlier restoration
30

Id. § 71-1-11(1) (Supp. 1965). "If the report of the medical commission finds that
the respondent is mentally ill or mentally deficient, and recommends indefinite
commitment and adjudication, the court shall, within six days after the return of said
report, enter an order adjudicating the respondent mentally ill or mentally deficient."
Id. (Emphasis added).
131Id. § 71-1-26 (1963).
If any reputable person shall file in the court by which a person has been
adjudicated mentally ill or mentally deficient, a written petition setting
forth the adjudicated respondent is no longer mentally ill or mentally
deficient, supported by the certificate of a doctor... said court shall immediately appoint two reputable doctors... to examine the respondent...
and to report their findings to the court ....
If from such examination it
shall be found by the court that the respondent ... is no longer mentally ill
or mentally deficient, the court shall forthwith enter an order of competency ....
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statute containing an identical "findings by the court" provision makes it clear that the court has the power to make its
own findings in a restoration proceeding and that the findings
of the doctors are only advisory.' 3 2
11. Trial by Court or Jury
The questions considered by the medical commission must
be tried by the court or by jury if the respondent, his attorney,
the guardian ad litem, his legal guardian, parent, spouse, or
adult next of kin files a written demand for such a trial within
five days after the entry of the order of adjudication or commitment. 1MF If any of these specified persons demands a trial,
the judge has no discretion and must grant the request.'
a. Adjudication order interlocutory during trial
demand period
The adjudication order remains interlocutory during the
five day period when a trial can be demanded, and, if a demand
is made, the order remains interlocutory pending the outcome
of the trial.13" Even though the order is interlocutory under
these circumstances, the court still possesses the power to appoint a conservator and to authorize the conservator to take
36
appropriate action on behalf of his ward.'
b. Longer trial demand period if respondent removed
from county
If the respondent is removed from the county during that
five day period he is allowed an additional fifteen days (or a
total of twenty days after the entry of the adjudication order)
to file a demand. 3 7 If a jury trial demand is made before the
respondent is removed from the county, the judge of the court
is required to issue an order detaining the respondent in the
38
county for a period not exceeding five days.'
132

Hill v. People, 118 Colo. 571, 577, 198 P.2d 450, 452 (1948).

33

1' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-13'(1)

(Supp. 1965).

13 4 id. § 71-1-13(2) (1963). See Young v. Brofman, 139 Colo. 296, 338 P.2d 286
(1959).
135 Young v. Brofman, 139 Colo. 296, 303, 338 P.2d 286, 290 (1959).
'36 Id.
37

' CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-13(1)

(Supp. 1965). Prior to the 1960 amendment

allowing the respondent fifteen additional days to file a demand for a jury trial if
removed from the county of commitment, the supreme court had reversed two adjudication orders in cases where the respondent had been removed from the county of
commitment before the five-day trial demand period had expired. Hultquist v. People,
77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 995 (1925) and Watkins v. People, 140 Colo. 228, 344 P.2d
682 (1959).
13

8 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-13'(1)

(Supp. 1965).
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c. jury trial
If a jury is requested, the court is required to order a jury
of six to be summoned within one month.' 8 9 Trial procedure
is governed by the law pertaining to civil jury trials. 140 The
findings of the medical commission are admissible as evidence,
if identified by the person or persons who have verified the
commission report' 4 ' and who are subject to examination and
cross examination the same as a witness in other civil actions. 4 2
The judge is required to instruct the jury that the medical
commission findings may be overcome by a preponderance of
the evidence. 4 ' However, the Colorado Supreme Court has
held that this provision is merely a redundant reiteration of a
fundamental rule of law which exists without aid of the statute.1 ' It declared that the county has the burden of proof by
a preponderance of evidence throughout a hearing or trial on
commitment and that this burden could not be shifted to the
respondent.' 4 5 Furthermore, the court found that a jury instruction stating that "the report of the medical commission can only
be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence" was improper
in that it gave undue evidentiary strength to the report of the
medical commission and appeared to limit the ways in which
the report could be overcome. 46 The court declared that a
respondent was under no obligation to present any evidence,
and, if he desired, could overcome whatever evidentiary weight
the commission report possessed in several ways not involving
the presentation of evidence. 14 He could, for example, attack
the veracity of the report or the credibility of the medical commissioners on cross examination. 1 48 Although the failure of the
court to give a jury instruction concerning expert (psychiatric)
testimony was not raised by the appellants, the court specifically
found that the trial court should always tender such an instruc1 49
tion on its own motion if not requested to do so by counsel.
The jury in rendering its verdict, is required to answer the
same questions which the medical commission is required to
9

13

Id. § 71-1-13(2)

(1963).

14Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.

143Id.
144 Sabon v. People, 142 Colo. 323, 325, 350 P.2d 576, 577-78 (1960).
145 d. at 325, 350 P.2d at 577.

14'ld.
1471d. at 325-26, 350 P.2d at 578.

148 Id.
149 Id. at 329, 350 P.2d at 579.
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answer. 5 ' The judge is required to enter a decree in accordance with the jury findings, unless it is his opinion that the
findings are contrary to the weight of the applicable law and
evidence. 5 ' If the court so finds, the judge may set aside the
jury finding and enter an order notwithstanding the findings
of the jury.' 52 Otherwise, the court must enter an order discharging the respondent if all questions are answered in the
53
negative.'
According to court officials in the Denver metropolitan
area, the right to a trial is seldom exercised. Often a substantial
estate is involved in those few cases where a trial is demanded.
The fact that the law does not require anyone to inform an
adjudicated respondent of his right to trial could well be a
major reason that trial demands are infrequent. In Hawkyard,
the Colorado Supreme Court said: "In the motion for a new
trial it is alleged that defendant was not advised of his right
to a jury trial. Conceding this as a fact, our attention is not
directed to any statute requiring the court or the county attorney or the guardian ad litem to impart this information to a
defendant."' 5 4
F. Restoration, PartialRestoration and Administrative
Discharge
There are three ways in which a respondent may be released from the confinement imposed by an order of adjudication and commitment. He may be adjudicated competent and
be immediately released from confinement and relieved of all
legal disabilities resulting from incompetency.' 5 5 The respondent may also be restored to competency and released by the
court on its own motion if the superintendent or chief medical
officer of a hospital files a verified statement with the court
stating that a respondent in his custody is no longer mentally
ill or deficient. The hospital officer is required to file this
statement whenever he has reason to believe that the respondent is no longer mentally ill or deficient.' 5 6 The Colorado
Supreme Court has held, in interpreting earlier statutes, that
the hospital administrator has authority to discharge a respon5
10COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-13(3) (1963). "The verdict of the jury shall be
answer to the questions set forth in section 71-1-7(2)." Id.

151
Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.

154 Hawkyard v. People, 115 Colo. 35, 38-39, 169 P.2d 178, 180 (1946).
15 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-26 (1963).
6

15

Id. § 71-1-27 (1963).

in
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dent only if he is restored to reason.' 57 If the administrator
discharges a respondent not restored to reason, the court can
return him to confinement without a new hearing. 5 '
1. Administrative Discharge
A respondent may be freed by an administrative discharge.
If the statutory conditions are fulfilled, an administrative discharge follows a conditional release, granted by the head of a
state hospital or training home or the chief officer of a veterans administration hospital, who believes that a conditional
59
release is in the best interest of the respondent or society.1
The court which committed the respondent must be notified
in writing of this release.' 6 ° If a conditionally released respondent is not returned to the institution within two years after
his release, his name must be stricken from the rolls of the
institution, and he must be administratively discharged.' 6 ' This
discharge must be entered on the records of the institution, and
written notice must be filed with the court which committed
the respondent. 62 The benefit of administrative discharge is
also made available to a respondent who escapes from an institution and is not returned within a period of one year after
his escape. 65
The effect of an administrative discharge is limited. An
administratively discharged respondent may be compelled to
return to the institution only by an order of court issued after
64
proof of need for further institutional care is produced.
An administrative discharge does not operate as an adjudi65
cation of competency.'
2. Competency Restoration Adjudication
Any reputable person may institute a restoration proceeding by filing a written petition with the court which has adjudicated the respondent's competency, stating that the respondent
is no longer mentally ill or deficient 66 This petition must be
accompanied by the certificate of a doctor licensed to practice
57

1 Metuxos v. People, 76 Colo. 264, 230 P. 608 (1924).

158Id.
'59 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
16

0 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
1

6Id. § 71-1-28(4)
16 5 1d. § 71-1-28(3)
18

(1963).
(1963).

Id. § 71-1-26 (1963).

§ 71-1-28(1) (Supp. 1965).
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medicine.1 67 Upon receipt of such a petition the court is required to appoint two reputable doctors licensed to practice
medicine to examine the respondent at the place where he is
then physically present and to report their findings to the
court.' 6 ' If the respondent is confined at the time the petition
is filed, at least one of the appointed doctors must have no
association with the institution of confinement.' 69 If the court
finds from the examination that the respondent is no longer
mentally ill or deficient, it shall enter an order of competency
which frees the respondent from confinement and all legal
disabilities resulting from adjudication.' 7 After entering its
order adjudicating competency, the court has no power to issue
further orders regarding the restored respondent's property
except those which may be necessary to settle the accounts of
the conservator and to restore the property to the respondent. 7 '
The court must forward a copy of the order of competency to
72
the department of institutions.'
G. Additional Case Law Concerning Commitment Proceedings
In addition to the points already mentioned in conjunction
with individual sections of the commitment statute, the Colorado Supreme Court has also decided various other more general questions involving the commitment/adjudication statutes.
It has repeatedly stressed that a proceeding under the commitment laws is a special statutory proceeding neither criminal
nor civil in nature.'7 3 Because of their special nature- their
sole aim being to benefit the respondent - the high court has
held the testimonial privilege statutes to be inapplicable to
commitment proceedings."'
The court has also repeatedly stated that the properly
asserted jurisdiction of a court in a commitment proceeding
is a continuing one and that consequently orders and judgments
67

1

Id.

168d.

169 Id.
70
1 Id.

People ex rel. Smith v. County Court of Fremont County, 106 Colo. 95, 101, 102 P.2d
476, 478 (1940).
172
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-26 (1963).
73
1 See Sabon v. People, 142 Colo. 323, 350 P.2d 576 (1960); Kendall v. People, 126
Colo. 573, 252 P.2d 91 (1952) ; Okerberg v. People, 119 Colo. 529, 205 P.2d 224
(1949).
174
See Hawkyard v. People, 115 Colo. 35, 169 P.2d 178 (1946). In this case the
attorney-client privilege was held inapplicable to a medical commission hearing.
Id. at 39, 169 P.2d at 180. See also Sabon v. People, where the husband-wife privilege
was held not applicable to a jury trial commitment proceeding. 142 Colo. 323, 329,
350 P.2d 576, 579 (1960).
171
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entered in such proceedings are open to reconsideration and
modification by the court of original jurisdiction upon the application of any party in interest, at any time before the respondent
is adjudicated competent or dies.17
On this ground the high court has not allowed judgments
and orders in commitment cases to be challenged in collateral
actions such has habeas corpus proceedings.'7 6 If the court
entering a commitment order had no jurisdiction to do so,
however, the order may be challenged in a habeas corpus
1 77
proceeding.
The cases indicate that although orders and judgments
entered in commitment proceedings are continually open to
modification, they still possess the degree of finality necessary
for appeal.

III.

RECOMMENDATIONS, CRITICISMS, AND EVALUATIONS

A. Introduction
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 71-1-23 (1963). Rights of Respondent. - (1) Every respondent shall be entitled
to humane care and treatment. No respondent shall
lose any civil rights nor forfeit any legal status unless
he has been adjudicated mentally ill or mentally deficient. Upon the entry of any order of competency,
any adjudicated respondent shall be restored and entitled to all civil rights and legal status of any other
mentally competent person. (2) Any person in custody under this article shall have the right to communicate with his attorney, by sealed mail or otherwise.
This first sentence of this statute indicates that respondents are to receive humane care. In general it can be fairly
said, if my observations at Fort Logan are typical of state-wide
practice, that respondents do receive humane care within the
mental institutions of Colorado. The mental health professionals are conscientiously striving to provide the most effective treatment possible for those committed to their charge
within the limitations of the resources available to them. However, the commitment process fails to satisfy this statutory
175

176

See Hill v. People, 118 Colo. 571, 198 P.2d 450 (1948); People ex rel. Best v.
County Court, 110 Colo. 249, 132 P.2d 799 (1942); People v. Musser, 75 Colo.
257, 225 P. 218 (1924) ; In re Rainbolt, 64 Colo. 581, 171 P. 1068 (1918).
See Zimmerman v. Angels, 137 Colo. 129, 321 P.2d 1105 (1958); Klancher v.

Anderson, 113 Colo. 478, 158 P.2d 923 (1945); In re Rainbolt, 64 Colo. 581, 171
P. 1068 (1918).

177 Hunt v. People, 76 Colo. 231, 230 P. 607 (1924).
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requirement and it is towards the commitment procedures
themselves that my comments are aimed.
The criticisms, evaluations and recommendations which
follow are not intended to form a detailed blueprint for the
reformation of the present system of involuntary hospitalization and commitment. They do, however, indicate problems and
concerns which the legal profession, the medical profession,
and ultimately legislators must take into account if a fairer,
more orderly and more humane hospitalization and commitment process is to be established.
B. Philosophical Principles to Guide Policy Decisions
The United States conceives of itself as a free and open
society. In such a society every individual should be guaranteed
the maximum amount of individual freedom consistent with
the well-being and safety of others and of society as a whole.
The decision to divest an individual of any part of his freedom or any of his rights should not be undertaken lightly or
perfunctorily.
Compulsory hospitalization and commitment proceedings
have traditionally been justified by the courts because they
benefit the individual subject to them. Although the "benefit"
concept is appealing, it has seldom, if ever, been realized in
practice. It is time that this "benefit" conception be implemented in a rational manner. The commitment process should
insure that a searching inquiry and determination - guided by
reasonably well-defined standards - is made as to what course
of action would confer the most benefit on the individual.
With these guiding principles in mind, the following
recommendations are submitted. Some of the recommendations
envision a drastic legislative revision of the present system.
Others suggest major reforms within the basic framework of
the present process.
C. Who Should Be Hospitalized?
1. The Short Term Hospitalization Law
The policy question of who should be compulsorily hospitalized or committed is perhaps the most difficult problem
in the field of involuntary civil commitment. Presently, the
Colorado law allows an individual to be hospitalized for up
to six months if a reputable person and a licensed physician
believe that it would be in the best interest of the respondent
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to be hospitalized.'
He is not required to present a danger
to himself or others nor does the statute require that he be
suffering from any particular mental illness or defect, nor does
it state that he must display a certain form of aberrant behavior.
The term "in the best interest of" is clearly exceedingly
broad and vague. It poses a serious potential threat to the liberty and security of all citizens. This is true because of the
unique nature of mental illness. The conception of mental illness (at least that which lacks a clearly discernible organic
basis) is inextricably linked to the behavioral values and standards established by society. In fact the symptoms of mental
illness consist of a noticeable deviation from societal norms on
the part of an individual. As anthropologists and other social
scientists have frequently pointed out, behavior which in one
society would constitute conclusive evidence of mental illness
would bring its perpetrator wide public praise in another. 7 '
The same situation can exist between sub-groups within the
same society.
It is possible that the compulsory mental treatment process might be used as a quiet, tidy means of suppressing dissent
or behavior unpleasing to the government or society. The practice of the Soviet Union is perhaps the best known and most
extreme example of this practice."8 ) In America, well known
writers and intellectuals are not removed by these means as
they are in the Soviet Union, but the system could readily be
converted and consciously applied toward the end of suppressing dissent as long as the vague terminology exists in the law.
Thus, unless we desire to use the involuntary hospitalization and commitment system as a means of enforcing conformity to societal beliefs and conventions, and unless we desire to move toward a therapeutic state'
where all nonconformists and troublesome people are viewed as "mental health"
problems, vague statutory standards for compulsory hospitalization and commitment should be eliminated. In regard to the
Colorado hospitalization statute, a showing that the individual
whose hospitalization is sought is dangerous to himself or others
should be required, and some reasonable definition should be
given to the term "dangerous."
178 The statutory requirements concerning short term involuntary hospitalization are
found in section 71-1-4. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-4 (Supp. 1965).
1 9 See generally T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
0

18 See V. TARSIS, WtRD 7 (1965).
181 For an interesting expression of the viewpoint that the United States is moving in

this direction, see Kaplan, Civil Commitment "As you Like it,"' 49 B.U.L. REV. 14
(1969).
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2. The Indefinite Term Commitment Statute
Most of the same criticisms set out above apply to the
present indefinite term commitment process, where the statute
speaks of the respondent's mental or emotional functions being
so impaired as to require protection, supervision, treatment or
confinement for his own welfare or the welfare or safety of
others, and his lack of ability to manage his own affairs.1 82
"Own welfare" and "welfare of others" are, of course,
terms which are as vague as the term "in the best interest of."
"Safety of others" seems to furnish a more manageable standard.
The question of a person's capacity to manage his own affairs is
an issue with which the courts, but not the medical commissions have had a long experience.
Regardless of the particular standards adopted to determine whether an individual is a proper subject for commitment and adjudication, they must be conscientiously applied by
the trier of the facts to be of any value. Presently, medical commissions make no in-depth inquiry as to what the "welfare of
the respondent" is or as to what the "safety and welfare of
others" consists of in each particular case. If the medical commission is to be retained as the decision-making agency in involuntary civil commitments, it should be specifically required
to make a thorough inquiry and specifically report its findings
with regard to these matters as part of its normal hearing
procedure.
D. Preliminary Investigation by Mental Health Professionals
in Place of Physician's Letter
Presently an individual can be hospitalized for up to 6
months on the basis of a verified petition and a physician's
letter. He can be committed for an indefinite term by a similar
procedure. The medical commission hearing which is an additional requirement in commitment cases adds nothing substantial because of its perfunctory nature. The physician submitting
the letter is not required to be a specialist in mental disorders.
Often he submits the letter on the basis of only a cursory examination or interview. Consequently many people are forced
into the care of the mental hospitals who are not proper subjects for the kind of care offered by these institutions.
To rectify the deficiencies in the initial phases of the
commitment procedure, the requirement of a physician's letter
should be abolished. Instead, whenever a petition for hospitali82

1

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-1(1) (b) (c)

(1963).
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zation or commitment is filed with the court, it should be referred to a team of mental health professionals (psychiatrists,
psychologists and social workers) whose job it would be to
investigate the matter fully and make recommendations to the
court as to the best course of action. The court would not be
bound by such a recommendation, but would be required to
give it serious consideration. No individual should be hospitalized during this investigatory period unless a showing was made
to the court that the individual presented a substantial danger
to himself or others.
E. Voluntary Action Should Be Encouraged
If some form of mental health care is necessary, the mental
health team should be required to make a serious attempt to
get the individual to agree to voluntarily accept their recommendations before resorting to any compulsory process. The
psychiatrists and mental health workers I have talked with believe that most persons who need treatment will accept it voluntarily if they have the benefit of effective counseling.
F. The Medical Commission Should Be Abolished
If a compulsory process is believed necessary, a hearing
to determine whether it should be invoked should be held before a court, not a medical commission. Courts have the experience to maintain an orderly procedure, conduct a fair hearing,
and weigh evidence properly. Further, as full-time public servants whose special skill and function is to adjudicate, judges
are free of the conflict of interest problems which clearly affect
the decision making capacities of busy doctors pulled reluctantly
away from private practice.
G. Effective Counsel For the Respondent
Perhaps the greatest single need from a due process standpoint is the need for every respondent to be furnished with
effective counsel.
The guardian ad litem does not adequately fulfill this
function for several reasons. First of all, the statutes are extremely vague in spelling out the duties of a guardian ad litem.
In short term hospitalization cases the law requires only that
he make such investigation as may be necessary to protect the
interests of the respondent, that he make certain that respondent is advised of his right to a hearing, and that he make a
report of his investigation to the court.' 8 3 No attempt has been
1

8id. § 71-1-4(3) (Supp. 1965).
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made by the legislature, the supreme court, or the bar association to spell out what the interests of a respondent are or what
kind of an investigation is adequate in such cases. Thus, each
individual guardian ad litem must determine his role for himself. As illustrated by the accounts in previous sections of this
article most guardians ad litem in hospitalization cases generally perform in a perfunctory manner.
In involuntary commitment proceedings where the respondent stands to suffer far more serious deprivations than in short
term hospitalization proceedings, the statute defining the duties
of a guardian ad litein requires even less. The attorney is simply required to attend all meetings of the medical commission
and to make a report to the court. This report contains primarily information about the respondent's financial and family
status.' True, one Colorado Supreme Court case has interpreted
the statutory language as requiring the guardian ad litem to
investigate and prepare prior to the first medical commission
hearing.'
Yet, in another case the court interpreted the statutes more literally and stated that the guardian ad litem had
no duty to inform the respondent of his right to a court or jury
trial of the issues decided by the medical commission.'8 6
Two steps should be taken to insure that every respondent
enjoys effective representation. First, the statutes must be revised so that the role of counsel is spelled out in greater detail. 1 87 Second, wherever possible a full-time public defender
staff should be established to deal with mental health matters.
Defining a role for counsel in mental health proceedings
will not be an easy task because these proceedings differ
markedly in purpose, at least theoretically, from criminal actions. A joint committee composed of representatives of the
legal and psychiatric disciplines should be convened to study
the problem and present a proposal to the legislature.
It has been recommended that counsel in mental health
proceedings perform the following tasks:
(1) Advise the commitment or adjudication process subject thoroughly of the nature of the process, his rights
under it, and all of its legal implications.
(2) Check the accuracy of the alleged behavioral incidents
I-Id. § 71-1-8 (1963).
85

1

Hultquist v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 995 (1925).

186 Hawkyard v. People, 115 Colo. 35, 38-39, 169 P.2d 178, 180 (1946).
187 The term "guardian ad litem" should be dropped. A respondent should be assured of
counsel, preferably the same attorney, not only during the course of a particular
hearing, but during the entire period of his subjection to court order under the statute.
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or psychological symptoms (e.g. reported delusions,
erratic behavior, etc.) upon which the state relies.
(3) Attempt to determine what would be best for the
client by interviewing family members, doctors, social
workers, etc., and by exploring alternative courses of
treatment or action.
(4) Insure that all aspects of an individual's case are seriously considered at the hearing and that the decision
maker is apprised of all possible alternatives.
(5) If a client is committed, the attorney should continue
to follow the case periodically to see that the client
is receiving proper care and treatment.'8 8
The low rate of compensation is a major reason for the
ineffectiveness of counsel in mental health cases, yet to pay
an attorney a fee comparable to that which he would receive
in private practice would strain the public financial resources.
A full-time salaried professional staff could avoid this problem. Counties with low rates of hospitalization and commitment activity could be joined together to form public defender
districts.
A second benefit would result from a public mental patient
defender system. The attorneys could easily be given special
training in the mental health field. Further, their daily involvement in the total mental health process would undoubtedly
make them more effective in the area than attorneys only infrequently working in the field.
H. Opportunity For Examination By an Independent
Psychiatrist
The respondent should have the right to an examination
by a psychiatrist not associated with any state agencies or institutions. The testimony or report of this expert should be accorded as much weight as those of the treating team.
I. Liberty and Rights Should Be Protected From Abrogation
Today an order of adjudication serves as blanket judgment of incompetency for all legal purposes. 8 9 The present
procedure is favored by many of the participants in the process
precisely because of this feature. In their view it is nice to be
able to wrap everything up in one proceeding. Yet, the normal
tradition and practice of the law is the opposite. The law recog18 Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44
TEXAs

L. REv. 424, 450-57 (1966).

158 See Appendix.
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nizes that a person may be mentally incompetent for one purpose but not for another. For instance, an individual may be
mentally incompetent to make a will but not possess that kind
and degree of incompetency which would justify compulsory
confinement.
The Colorado Supreme Court has already recognized that
meanings of the term "mental incompetency" can differ in
dissimilar situations by ruling that the fact that an individual
has been adjudicated mentally incompetent is not necessarily
conclusive on the question of testimonial, testamentary, and
contractual capacity.' 90
Why should this fundamental legal fact not be recognized
and implemented by the mental incompetency adjudication
process? The prime function of the law is not to serve the convenience of those charged with its administration. This is especially true where the basic liberty and rights of human beings
are at stake. The judicial, adjudication, and hospitalization proceedings should require the court to make specific findings
concerning each right or portion of liberty which the respondent is alleged to be mentally incompetent to enjoy.
J. Indefinite Term Commitments Should Be Abolished.
Presently, when an individual is adjudicated and committed he is placed in the hands of institutional administrators
and cut adrift from the legal process, which for all practical
purposes, takes no further interest in him. A Colorado statute''
gives a respondent the right to communicate with an attorney
and with the judge of the court. These statutorily prescribed
rights have little meaning for the typical respondent who is
of modest means and whose understanding of the legal system
is not great. He becomes, in effect, a forgotten person as far
as the legal system is concerned.
The implications of this fact may not presently be so
horrifying in view of the current trend in Colorado toward
the adoption of enlightened mental health treatment policies.
Yet the day when hundreds of mental patients sat in gloomy,
custodial isolation is not so remote in the experience of the
state that the potential ability an involuntary commitment system possesses to inflict grief and injustice cannot be appreciated. Further, even in the most progressive and enlightened
of mental health systems, pockets of insensitivity and neglect
are bound to exist.
190 See cases cited in Appendix.
191 COLO.

REV.

STAT. ANN.

§ 71-1-23(2)

(Supp. 1965).
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It is imperative, therefore, that the legal system be obliged
to demonstrate a continuing interest in those compulsorily
placed in the custody of the mental health agencies. All such
orders should be reviewable periodically, perhaps every three
or four months, by the court. The public defender should be
required to contact every respondent at the end of this same
period to discuss his treatment with him, and also make an
independent investigation (e.g. by interviewing the treating
doctors, etc.) of his treatment and prognosis. The defender
would be required to submit a report of his investigation to
the court. At every such interval the respondent, by himself
or through the public defender should be able to demand a
court hearing, challenging either the confinement or custody
per se or challenging the manner of treatment or confinement.
This would, of course, not preclude the availability of court
review between these particular dates if extraordinary circumstances warrant it.
K. Sensitivity Training

Most people probably have the impression that doctors,
social workers, and others involved in the so-called service professions are, of necessity, more kind, patient, and sensitive than
are ordinary persons. My experience in studying the involuntary commitment system and in other dealings with members
of these professions leads me to conclude that a substantial
number of these people are, if anything, more calloused and
insensitive than laymen. This hardening process no doubt takes
place over a long period of time and results from their prolonged and continuous exposure to all varieties of human misfortune.
After long exposure people stop appearing as individuals
with special qualities and needs and become "types" to be
treated in a cold, efficient, "professional" manner which is
sometimes ineffectually concealed by a stereotyped mask of
conviviality. The prospect of a fee encourages the doctor or
lawyer to exhibit at least a mechanical concern for his paying
patient or client, but he is likely to view those problem-ridden
persons not likely to achieve this status as burdensome "cases"
to be disposed quickly.
It is important that those who are involved in compulsory
mental health procedures, therefore, be afforded frequent
opportunities to better understand themselves and those with
whom they work. They should not only be encouraged, if not
required, to participate in courses which convey an intellectual
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understanding of recent developments in the mental health
field, but they should also take part in recently-devised "sensitivity" programs which are designed to give an individual a
total and unified understanding of himself and others- both
emotionally and intellectually.
L. The Role of the Medical Commission
If the medical commission is to be retained, its duties
should be more specifically defined. Today, if the examples
related in this paper can be taken as representative of statewide practice, medical commissions perform totally perfunctory
roles, automatically recommending commitment for most of
the individuals placed in front of them. Hearing procedures
are frequently outrageously chaotic and evidentiary standards
of any kind appear to be nonexistent.
The statutes should set out a procedural format for the
conduct of commission hearings, if for no other reason than
to infuse such proceedings with some measure of dignity. Some
minimum evidentiary requirements should be imposed. Again,
an interdisciplinary study would probably be necessary to establish these procedures and standards.
M. Modification of Voluntary HospitalizationProvision
The present voluntary hospitalization statute allows any
hospital to detain a voluntarily admitted patient up to five days
after he has filed a written request for release, if hospital officials believe that he is mentally ill or that he displays symptoms of mental illness or deficiency. 1 92 An individual could be
kept longer than five days since the statute excludes Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays from the computation of the five-day
period.
This power to detain is greater than that enjoyed by peace
officers under the emergency detention statute. Under that statute an individual cannot be held for longer than twenty-four
hours (Saturdays, Sundays and holidays are again excluded in
computing the time) without a court order. Further, the peace
officer must in good faith believe not only that the individual
is mentally ill or mentally deficient, but also that he is danger1 3
ous to himself or others.
Clearly, the five-day "hold" and the written request for
release requirements under the voluntary hospitalization statute
are harsh, unnecessary measures which can only serve to dis'-Id. § 71-1-2(3)(d) (Supp. 1965).
19 3
Id. § 71-1-3(1) (1963).

1969

CIVIL COMMITMENT IN

COLORADO

courage voluntary hospitalization. The emergency detention
provisions seem sufficient to handle a patient posing a threat
to himself or others. Otherwise, if the hospital officials believe
that a patient needs further compulsory treatment, they should
be required to follow the provisions of the short term hospitalization statute without the benefit of a lengthy "hold" period
exercised at their own discretion without judicial supervision.
N. Records and Statistics
It is clear from even a cursory observation of the present
involuntary commitment process that the system is being used
to deal with a wide variety of society's problems. Yet no records are presently available which show exactly what problems
the individuals becoming subject to the system possess.
In order to gain a clear idea of what functions the system
is presently performing, an accurate, statewide record of all
hospitalization and commitment cases would be invaluable.
These records should show precisely what problems the respondents possess (i.e., alcoholism, drug addiction, schizophrenia, etc.), and how they become subject to the process
(i.e., who set the commitment process in motion - a family
member, the housing authority, the welfare department, etc.).
With a better knowledge of the system, an intelligent
policy evaluation of its operation could be made. A determination could be made as to which problems are suitable for the
commitment and hospitalization process and which problems
are not.
0. The Problems of the Aged
An extremely large number of elderly persons are adjudicated and committed under the present law. Sometimes an older
person is adjudicated because he needs someone to handle his
financial affairs.
Presently there are two ways in which an estate can be
opened and a conservator appointed. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 153-9-2 (Supp. 1965) requires the court to appoint a conservator for an individual who is adjudicated mentally incompetent and has assets needing conservation. Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 153-9-13 (Supp. 1965) establishes a voluntary estate
procedure. Under the provisions of this statute an estate must
be opened, and a guardian appointed, if a person files a verified petition for the appointment of a guardian with the court
of jurisdiction in the county of his residence, or, if he is a nonresident, in the county where some of his property is located.
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The petition must be accompanied by a written statement signed
by a licensed, practicing physician which states that in the physician's opinion the petitioner was mentally competent at the
time he signed the petition, but that by reason of old age, disease, physical infirmity, alcoholism, drug addiction, or some
other cause he is not able to properly manage his estate and
that the appointment of a guardian would be in his best interest.
In Denver this latter procedure is rarely counseled as an
alternative to adjudication both because of the difficulty involved in obtaining a proper physician's statement and because
the city attorneys generally prefer adjudication in order to
facilitate confinement of the individual at a later date if this
should appear necessary. A person may also be adjudicated for
the additional reason that he needs institutional care and will
not voluntarily enter a hospital or nursing home.
Presently, medical commission hearings involving elderly
persons (referred to by mental health professionals as "geriatrics problems") are, if this can be possible, more perfunctory
than those in which the respondents are younger people. Usually
a son, daughter or other member of the family petitions for
an adjudicatory hearing and then all of the participants in the
process, including the guardian ad litem, cooperate to see that
the goal of adjudication is reached as quickly and smoothly
as possible.
The present procedure for handling the problems of the
conservation of an aged individual's assets should be abolished
because it serves no protective function for the subject. The
same end could be reached by the adoption of a simpler and
more economical procedure. Frequently, everyone, including
the respondent himself, agrees that a conservator should be
appointed, and the current cumbersome process constitutes a
meaningless annoyance.
One approach which could be adopted would be to allow
a family member or some other interested person to petition
the court for the appointment of a conservator for an aged
person whose mind is failing. Upon receipt of such a petition,
it would be the duty of the mental health public defender, or
an attorney appointed for this purpose, to investigate the matter, interview the individual for whom a conservatorship is
sought, inform him of the legal nature of a conservatorship,
and advise him of his right to a court hearing with representation by counsel, if he disagrees with the appointment of a
conservator on his behalf. If he requests a hearing, the public
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defender or some specially appointed qualified attorney should
represent the individual in the same effective manner that an
attorney would represent a client in private practice who desired to contest the appointment of a conservator on his behalf.
The district or city attorney would have the duty of presenting
the case for the conservatorship if he felt that it was warranted. The court would follow the same procedure and tests
it presently applies in cases involving an individual's testamentary capacity or his capacity to contract.
This procedure would not necessarily need to be limited
to the elderly. The statute could provide that a conservatorship
could be set up for an indvidual regardless of age.
APPENDIX
THE LEGAL STATUS OF A
MENTALLY INCOMPETENT INDIVIDUAL IN COLORADO
I. INTRODUCTION

The statutes do not clearly specify who is, for legal purposes, a mental incompetent. A definition of mental incompe-

tency is found in Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-1 (7) 1963, in the
chapter dealing with wills and estates:
"Mental incompetent," "incompetent person,
"incompetent," or "mentally ill person" denotes a
person who has been adjudicated mentally ill or men-

tally deficient, or who by the laws of this state is
designated as a lunatic, insane person, incompetent,
mental incompetent, incapable or feeble-minded, or
who has been found in an appropriate proceeding to
be unable or unfit to manage his own property.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 71-1-23(1) (1963) seems to imply
that an individual does not become legally mentally incompetent before he is adjudicated mentally ill or deficient:
Rights of respondent. -

(1)

Every respondent

shall be entitled to humane care and treatment. No
respondent shall lose any civil rights nor forfeit any
legal status unless he has been adjudicated mentally
ill or mentally deficient. Upon the entry of any order
of competency, any adjudicated respondent shall be
restored and entitled to all civil rights and legal status
of any other mentally competent person.
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LIABILITY FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE

In some areas a mentally incompetent individual, adjudicated or not adjudicated, is treated no differently from an
ordinary citizen. For instance, he is not relieved of liability
for his negligent acts by virtue of incompetency. In the case of
Johnson v. Lambotte,1 94 the Colorado Supreme Court followed
the majority rule"9 5 and declared that an incompetent person
is held to the same standard of care as a person of sound mind
as far as tortious negligence is concerned. The court intimated
that a different rule might apply with regard to torts requiring the elements of intent, or malice. This case involved a
woman who had left the mental hospital where she was confined under a hospitalization order, drove a car, and became
involved in an accident. Shortly after this time, she was adjudicated mentally incompetent.
In many areas, however, the Colorado law treats a mental
incompetent in a special way. Sometimes he is stripped of rights
and powers which most legally competent persons (barring
certain special groups such as felons) are allowed to exercise. In
some other areas the law affords a mental incompetent greater
protection than it gives a competent individual. In some cases,
the imposition of the disabilities and granting of these privileges depends on whether an individual has been formally
adjudicated incompetent, but in many cases it does not.
III.

DISABILITIES

A. Voting
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49-3-2(2) (1963) states:
No person under guardianship, non compos
mentis, or insane shall be entitled to register or to
vote at any general, primary or special election.
B. Disqualificationas a Witness
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 154-1-6(1) (1963) provides: -(a)
The following persons shall not be witnesses: (b) those who
are of unsound mind at the time of their production for examination ....
The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that the
question of whether an individual is of sound mind under this
statute is for the determination of the trial court in its sound
discretion, and that such a determination will not -be over194147 Colo. 203, 363 P.2d 165 (1961).
1

5See 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 122 (1945).
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turned, except where
Thus the fact that a
mentally incompetent
tion of soundness of

a clear abuse of discretion is shown. " '
prospective witness has been adjudicated
is not by itself determinative of the quesmind. 1 97

C. Testamentary Capacity
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-5-1 (1963) requires a person
to be of "sound mind and memory" to execute a will. The
Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that an adjudication of
incompetency by itself is not necessarily determinative of an
individual's testamentary capacity.'" 8 Instead, the supreme court
has declared the test of testamentary capacity to be a positive
showing that the testator understood the nature and consequences of his act.' 9
D. Motor Vehicle Operator's License
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-22(1) (Supp. 1965) requires
the motor vehicle bureau to immediately revoke an individual's
operator's or chauffeur's license when he is adjudicated incompetent. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-1(5) (1963), however authorizes the department of revenue to issue a license containing
any restrictions which may be desirable to insure the proper
operation of a motor vehicle to any person whose license has
been revoked as a result of an adjudication of incompetency.
For an incompetent to receive such a restricted license, a certified copy of the order of a medical commission approved by
the court adjudicating the individual mentally incompetent
must be filed with the department. The order must state that
the individual's mental condition as of the date of the finding
of incompetency will not impair in any respect his ability to
safely operate a motor vehicle on state highways. Before authorizing such a license, the statute requires the department
to make an examination of an unspecified nature.
E. Change of Beneficiary on an Insurance Policy
In the case of Crain v. Electrical Workers Benefit Association,"00 the Colorado Supreme Court applying the rule used
196 Garrison v. People, 158 Colo. 348, 408 P.2d 60 (1965).
197 Howard v. Hester, 139 Colo. 255, 338 P.2d 106 (1959). See generally Tubbs v.
Hilliard, 104 Colo. 164, 89 P.2d 535 (1939); Wilkinson v. People, 86 Colo. 406,
282 P.2d 257 (1929).
198 Martin v. Reid, 106 Colo. 69, 101 P.2d 25 (1940).

10 Cunningham v. Stender, 127 Colo. 293, 301, 255 P.2d 977 (1953).
"0 146 Colo. 361, 361 P.2d 442 (1961).
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in most jurisdictions decided that an attempted change of beneficiary by a mental incompetent is ineffective.
F. Adjudication of Incompetency as a Ground for Divorce or
Separate Maintenance

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-1-1(1) (i) (1963) states that an
individual may sue for divorce on the ground that his spouse
has been adjudicated mentally ill or deficient within the previous three years. However, the adjudicated spouse must not

have been restored to competency before the entry of the divorce decree. Even though a divorce may be granted, a husband
will not be relieved of his duty to support his incompetent wife
unless she has sufficient means to support herself. Colo. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 46-2-1(b) (1963) makes all grounds for divorce
sufficient bases in an action for separate maintenance and
therefore to be deemed mentally ill or deficient will fulfill
this requirement.
G. Mental Incompetency as a Ground for Annulment
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-3-1(g) (1963) makes a marriage voidable where "one or both of the parties were mentally
incapable of giving voluntary consent to the marriage." Here
again an adjudication of incompetency is not conclusive, but
2 1
serves only as evidence of the requisite mental incapacity. "
IV.

PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES AND SPECIAL
PROTECTIVE MEASURES

A. Conservatorship
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-9-2(1) (Supp. 1965) requires
the court of jurisdiction to appoint a conservator for an individual adjudicated mentally ill, if he is a resident in the county
or has property in the county which must be conserved, and
if a conservator has not already been appointed by another
Colorado court.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-9-4 (Supp. 1965) allows a
district or probate court to appoint a conservator for a nonresident of Colorado adjudicated mentally ill, who owns property in the state regardless of whether a conservator or other
fiduciary has been appointed in his state or county of residence.
An involunary conservaorship contains elements of both
a disability and of a privilege or special protective measure.
201

Young v. Colorado National Bank, 148 Colo.
(1961).

104, 118-19, 365 P.2d 701, 710
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On the one hand, the mental incompetent is divested of the
right to control his financial and general affairs as he sees fit.
But at the same time, the law affords his assets special protection by placing them in the hands of a presumably competent
fiduciary and placing liability on the estate rather than on the
incompetent personally."'
B. Execution of a Judgment Against an Incompetent
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-12-5(2) (1963) prohibits execution on a judgment against a mental incompetent and provides that the judgment must be filed as a claim against his
estate. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-12-3 (1963) lists the priorities of claims against a mental incompetent's estate.
C. Statute of Limitations
Colo. Rev. Slat. Ann. § 87-1-17 (1963) provides that statutes of limitation do not run against an individual who is
insane at the time the cause of action accrues. The statute does
not begin to run until after the individual has been restored
to competency. 3 The Colorado Supreme Court has held that
an adjudication of incompetency is not necessary for this statute to operate.2" 4
D. Contracts
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 71-1-21 (1963) provides that "all
contracts, agreements and credits with or to any insane person,
shall be absolutely void as against such person, his heirs, or
personal representatives; but persons making such contracts or
agreements with any insane person shall be bound thereby at
the election of his conservators. ' 2 05 The court has yet to be faced
with the problem of interpreting this statute in a case where
an individual had already been adjudicated incompetent prior
to entering a contract.
The question of whether an individual was incompetent
at the time of the making of the contract so as to relieve him
from liability under the contract is an issue to be resolved on
the facts of each individual case. The test to be applied is that
of whether the alleged incompetent was incapable of under2 02

See generally Ellis v. Colorado National Bank, 86 Colo. 391, 282 P. 255 (1929).
203 Other statutes may place limitations on this provision. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 87-2-3; 118-7-12; 118-7-13; 137-10-4 (1963).
2
04 Browne v. Smith, 119 Colo. 469, 205 P.2d 239'(1949).

205 The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that this statute does not necessarily apply
to an individual found not guilty by reason of insanity in a criminal proceeding. See
Davis v. Colorado Kenworth Corp., 156 Colo. 98, 396 P.2d 958 (1964).
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standing and appreciating the extent and effect of business
transaction in which he engaged.206
E. Conveyances
One early case held an attempted conveyance by an individual already adjudicated mentally incompetent at the time
of the conveyance to be absolutely void." ° ' The precise question
of the validity of a conveyance by one adjudicated mentally
incompetent at the time of the conveyance has not arisen in
modern cases. In cases where mental incompetency has been
asserted in an effort to invalidate a deed, the court has decided
such cases according to their particular facts by applying the
familiar test of whether the allegedly incompetent grantor
understood the nature and extent of the transaction.2 0 1

Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 168 P.2d 256 (1946) ; Ellis v. Colorado
National Bank, 90 Colo. 489, 498-99, 10 P.2d 336 (1932). Citing Ellis for this
proposition is Davis v. Colorado Kenworth Corp., 156 Colo. 98, 396 P.2d 958
(1964).
2Roher v. Darrow, 66 Colo. 463, 182 P. 13 (1919).
Wilson v. Girley, 145 Colo. 135, 357 P.2d 932 (1960) ; Bivens v. Van Matre, 129
Colo. 400, 270 P.2d 761 (1954) ; Ruffin v. Avara, 121 Colo. 567, 220 P.2d 355
(1950) ; Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 168 P.2d 256 (1946) ; Green
v. Hulse, 57 Colo. 238, 142 P. 416 (1914) ; Elder v. Schumacher, 18 Colo. 433,
33 P. 175 (1893).
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